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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of Scottish Highlanders in the 
founding and early settlement of the colony of Georgia. In order to answer questions 
regarding their presence it was necessary to conduct an investigation of the history of 
South Carolina, Georgia, and the southern border of the American colonies during the 
first decades of the eighteenth century. Included in the investigation of the Georgia 
Highlanders is a discussion of their culture, participation in the War of Jenkin’s Ear 
(1740-1745), contact with Indians, and the fate of their settlement of Darien.
It was found that nearly three hundred individuals -  men, women, and children -  
were recruited by James Oglethorpe and the governing Trustees of Georgia to leave the 
Highlands of Scotland and settle on the banks of the Altamaha River, south of Savannah, 
Georgia. The Trustees recruited these individuals specifically to serve as soldier-settlers 
to help protect the Georgia frontier from hostile Spaniards, Frenchmen, and Indians.
The result of research reveals that these Highlanders participated fully in the War 
of Jenkin’s Ear, fought between Great Britain and Spain, succeeding in their role of 
guardians of the southern frontier. Research also reveals that these Highlanders came 
into frequent contact with the Indians of the region, with whom they shared much in 
common, and beside whom they often fought. Lastly, it becomes clear that the welfare of 
the Highlanders’ town of Darien was tied closely to the military affairs of the region. 
Although the Scots were successful in fulfilling their roles as soldiers, this duty conflicted 
with their occupations as farmers, cattle-herders, and sawyers. Only after the end of the 
War of Jenkin’s Ear were the Highlanders able to firmly establish their community.
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INTRODUCTION
The founding of the colony of Georgia in 1732 occurred at a crucial time for 
Britain’s American empire and was the result of three seemingly separate, but ultimately 
intertwined endeavors. The first of these was a philanthropic project conceived by a 
group of English aristocrats, led by James Edward Oglethorpe, which was concerned over 
the plight of England’s poor and the burden they placed on English society. Oglethorpe 
and his associates believed that settling a new American colony with England’s poor 
would not only give these individuals new opportunity, it would also strengthen and 
enrich the empire. Accordingly, the second endeavor was a major interest of any 
imperial power: increased commerce. The third and perhaps the most driving of the three 
was the need to defend the American colonies’ southern boundary, particularly South 
Carolina.
Since her founding in the late seventeenth century South Carolina had endured 
violence and depredation as Britain’s southernmost American colony. Armed conflict 
with hostile Indians to the south and west and the need to defend against the perceived 
aggressive intentions of the Spanish in Florida and the French in Louisiana had nearly 
exhausted Carolina’s strength and resources. These years of conflict prompted her 
assembly and inhabitants to petition and plead with her governing Proprietors, as well as 
the British Crown, to implement more effective policies of defense and fortification.
By 1732, the British government was very aware of the urgent need to defend the 
region south of the Savannah River and, presented with both a source of settlers through 
the philanthropic project and the prospects of increased wealth, granted the charter for the
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founding of Georgia. The new colony was a product of international colonial rivalry and 
was originally established by Great Britain as a march colony, or military buffer. Georgia 
was meant to protect the lucrative British colonies to the north from three distinct threats: 
the expansionist-minded French to the west, the defensive Spanish to the south, and the 
several Indian nations native to the area. Oglethorpe and the Georgia Trustees, 
understanding the demands of such a situation, pursued three goals toward securing the 
colony: alliance with Indians, an increased number of white settlers, and military 
organization and fortification. The continual need for soldier-settlers capable of 
providing a reliable zone of defense inspired Oglethorpe to look to the rugged Highlands 
of Scotland. There he found a hardy and warlike people willing to leave the isolation of 
their native country to settle a colonial backwater, but one with strategic imperial 
implications.
Nearly three hundred Highland Scots settled in Georgia during the years 1736- 
1743. Recruited because of their reputation as fierce, reliable, and hardy warriors, they 
established a new home for themselves on the banks of the Altamaha River, where they 
continued to live much as they had in Scotland, preserving their social structure and 
culture and pursuing familiar industries. In the violent early years of the colony’s 
existence, these Highlanders served Oglethorpe and the British Crown well. Not only did 
they prove their value as warriors, they also founded one of the few settlements that 
survived Georgia’s infancy. The Scots’ early years of settlement were difficult ones, 
however. Their duties as soldiers hampered their ability to meet the Trustees’ 
expectations of quickly and firmly establishing their town of Darien. The settlement
3
struggled through its first years of existence, but once the Scots were no longer needed to 
defend the colony, they were able to turn their efforts to building a strong community.
4
CHAPTER I
The charter of the colony of Georgia, issued by King George II in June 1732, sets 
forth the reasons for establishing the colony: to allow England’s “poor subjects” an 
opportunity to “gain a comfortable subsistence for themselves and families;” to “increase 
the trade, navigation, and wealth of these our realms;” to “strengthen our colonies” and 
“protect all our loving subjects.” In order to accomplish these goals, the charter 
appointed twenty gentlemen to serve as “Trustees for Establishing the Colony of Georgia 
in America.”1
The philanthropic concern arose some years earlier in a project that at first seems 
completely unrelated to the danger and insecurity experienced by British colonists along 
South Carolina’s southern border. In 1729, Parliament appointed James Oglethorpe 
chairman of a committee to investigate English prison conditions. Oglethorpe came from 
a well-known Jacobite family, had served as an army officer, and had held a seat in 
Parliament since 1722, where he showed a strong interest in imperial affairs, gaining the 
respect of his colleagues who recognized him as honest and independent. He possessed 
high ambitions and extreme confidence in his own leadership abilities, never doubting 
that his training and experience would triumph over any problems he might face.2 In his 
role as committee chairman, he discovered not only intense overcrowding in English 
prisons but also that former prisoners, especially debtors, filled the streets and alleys of
1 Charter of the Colony, Colonial Records o f the State o f Georgia 1 (1970), 11-12.
2 Spalding, Oglethorpe in America, 1-3.
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English cities, unable to find work enough to support themselves.3 Oglethorpe, however, 
had strong faith in the power of British institutions to solve society’s evils and believed 
that men who had failed could succeed if given a second chance, thus his interest in 
leading the search for a solution to England’s widespread poverty.4 He and the other 
committee members felt that a new American colony would provide a welcome refuge for 
England’s urban poor and former prisoners. When the Georgia charter was granted, these 
philanthropists saw their opportunity, but their plans did meet with reservations.
The biggest concern over settling the new colony with poor British workers 
regarded the effect it would have on the British economy. Some members of the 
government feared that mass emigration would deplete Britain’s workforce. The authors 
of several tracts supporting the project made an effective argument against this fear. 
Argued one of these authors: “[I]f there be any poor, who do not, or cannot add to the 
riches of their country by labor, they must lie a dead weight on the public . . . these poor 
should be situated in such places, where they might be easy themselves, and useful to the 
commonwealth.”5 Oglethorpe, the author of one of these essays, added weight to the 
argument when he said, “they who can make life tolerable here are willing to stay at 
home, as it is indeed best for the kingdom that they should,” but those who for whatever 
reasons have been reduced to poverty should emigrate. Oglethorpe even appealed to the 
sensibilities of his fellow gentlemen, pointing out the possibility of their losing their 
wealth: “What various misfortunes may reduce the rich, the industrious, to the danger of 
a prison, to a moral certainty of starving! These are the people that may relieve
3 Charter of the Colony CRG 1, 11.
4 Spalding, Ogletorpe in America, 3.
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themselves and strengthen Georgia, by resorting thither, and Great Britain by their 
departure.” In Georgia, these people, willing to work, would have land so fertile “that 
they receive an hundredfold increase for taking very little pains.” According to 
Oglethorpe’s plan, these unfortunates would emigrate to Georgia at the expense of the 
Trustees, where they “are unfortunate indeed if [there] they cannot forget their sorrows.”6 
The Trustees’ philanthropic concerns did not stop at the English Channel; they 
looked to the continent for a second source of colonists. “The principal concern was to 
preserve Britain’s working skill and man power; therefore, the only elements within the 
population which could be sent overseas were those which embarrassed the community, 
and they should be supplemented with additions from the Continent. . . .  [t]here was a 
tendency throughout the eighteenth century to look outside English society proper for
n
emigration material.” At this time, that “emigration material” came in the person of 
persecuted European Protestants. Again one of the tract authors articulated the desire to 
recruit foreign Protestants; “[T]hey have, as well as our own poor a claim on our 
humanity, notwithstanding the narrow opinions, and mistaken politics of some, who think 
their charity should begin, continue, and end at home.” This appeals to a perceived 
English duty, as a Protestant nation, to provide a safe haven of opportunity for persecuted 
and exiled European Protestants. England itself could not support these refugees, as there 
was not enough work in England for English laborers, but sending them to Georgia would 
provide them with economic opportunity and religious freedom and would provide
5 “Reasons for Establishing the Colony of Georgia,” CGHS1, (1840), 204.
6 “A New and Accurate Account of the Provinces of South Carolina, Georgia, &c,”
CGHS 1. 56-58.
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Georgia with needed colonists. This same author summed up the argument saying, “How 
meritorious then will it be in us to preserve the lives of so many fellow citizens and 
subjects, and gain so many new ones as will be by this colony? Not only preserve their 
lives, but procure for them ease and affluence? And by this very act of humanity, get so
o
much new wealth for our country, by opening a new spring for our trade?” This English 
colonial practice of looking outside “English society proper for emigration material” 
foreshadows Oglethorpe’s later recruitment of Scottish Highlanders.
A second motivation for founding a new colony was the potential for commercial 
gain. The philanthropic-minded Trustees were, of course, businessmen and gentlemen, 
and certainly understood the commercial benefit of a new colony. Specifically, these 
imperialists hoped that a new colony would increase Britain’s trade and wealth by 
providing the mother country with products for which she had traditionally relied upon 
other countries, at great expense. Foremost among the hoped for Georgia exports listed 
by Oglethorpe were raw silk, wine, oil, cotton, drugs, and dying-stuffs. Not only would 
Britain be able to acquire these goods more cheaply, producing them would also enrich 
the growers in Georgia. Oglethorpe also expected Georgia to produce “every vegetable 
that can be found in the best countries under the same latitude.” The Trustees even hired 
a botanist to plant and care for such plants.9
In the early years of Georgia’s settlement, the Trustees shipped many seeds and 
plants to the colony in hopes of producing the exotic goods traditionally imported from
7 Trevor Richard Reese, Colonial Georgia: A Study in British Imperial Policy in the 
Eighteenth Century (Athens, Ga.,1963), 11.
8 “Reasons for Establishing the Colony of Georgia,” CGHS 1, 226, 230.
foreign countries: olive trees, cotton seeds, mulberry plants, burgundy vines, currant 
vines, barilla seed, bamboo plants, Neapolitan chestnuts, caper plants, and various other 
vine cuttings. According to the earliest records of Georgia exports, however, few of these 
endeavors proved successful. The largest exports in the early years were indigenous 
natural resources such as tar, lumber, casks of potash, caper plants, some vines, and tree 
bark. Silk, the most highly valued of the potential exports, seems to have started slowly. 
The first shipment of only eight pounds arrived in April 1735 and was woven into a 
“piece of Silk, and presented to the Queen.” The second shipment arrived four years later 
and remained on the Trustees’ account books until 1748. From 1739 to 1750, when the 
colony was turned over to the Crown, silk production increased, with a shipment arriving 
in England every one or two years, the largest shipment amounting to just over seventy 
nine pounds in 1749.10
The third and final reason for founding Georgia eventually consumed Oglethorpe, 
the only Trustee ever to visit the colony. By 1729, he and his fellow philanthropists were 
in contact with the Board of Trade, which at the time was considering a number of 
proposals for the better fortification of South Carolina’s southern border. The South 
Carolina Assembly had tried for years to defend the frontier both through their own 
colonizing efforts south of the Savannah River and by appealing to the British 
government for assistance. Each attempt had met with obstacles that prevented its 
success. Nonetheless, the British Crown realized that both a lucrative Indian trade and 
rice producing region were in jeopardy. Not only that, but with such a vulnerable
9 “A New and Accurate Account of the Provinces of South Carolina, Georgia, &c,”
CGHS 1, 68-69, 72.
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southern frontier, and with the balance of power in North America very much in question, 
a timely attack by either the neighboring French or Spanish could severely damage or 
even destroy Britain’s American empire. Georgia, therefore, was founded for a specific 
purpose and was the result of a very long process. In order to fully understand why the 
British government subscribed to the philanthropists’ concept of a charity colony, and 
ultimately why hundreds of Scotch Highlanders settled on its southern borders, one must 
understand the perilous position of South Carolina and the entire British American 
empire by 1732.
II
By the early eighteenth century, South Carolinians “had developed into a 
confident people, extremely warlike,” as a result of several years of nearly continuous 
fighting with Spaniards in Florida and neighboring Indians.11 Carolina planters had 
developed rice into a lucrative cash crop, and Carolina traders participated in an extensive 
Indian trade. As one colonial economist wrote, South Carolina’s prosperity was built 
upon “its Soil and Climate, producing a good Staple, the best of Rice; and from a 
neighboring vast Indian Country affording” Carolinians with captive slaves and “great 
quantities” of deerskins, some of which the Carolinians used, most of which were shipped
1 9to London.
10 General Account, CRG 3, (1970), 130-336.
11 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 5.
12 William Douglas, Postscript to a Discourse Concerning the Currencies, quoted in 
Vemer W. Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732 (1928), 111. Most of these slaves 
were captured enemy Indians particularly Choctaws. Crane claims that by 1708 there 
were 1,400 Indian slaves in Carolina as compared to 2,900 black slaves. He estimates 
that the number of Indian slaves did not greatly increase thereafter.
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Charles Town traders ventured deep into Indian-held lands to conduct business 
with the Creeks in Alabama and Georgia, the Chickasaws in Alabama, Mississippi, and 
Tennessee, the Choctaws in Alabama and Mississippi, the Yamasees in Georgia, and the
I o
Cherokees in South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee. Although 
before 1715 these nations were all nominally loyal to the British, the two that ultimately 
became the most important to the defense of South Carolina and later Georgia were the 
Creek confederacy and the large and powerful Cherokees.
The Creek confederacy was made up of two branches, the Upper and Lower 
Creeks. Before 1716 the Lower Creeks numbered 2,400 people, 730 of them men, and 
lived in ten or eleven towns along the Ochese Creek at the head of the Ocmulgee River. 
Governor Robert Johnson of South Carolina described these Indians as “great hunters and 
warriors, who consumed large quantities of English goods.” Among the Lower Creeks, 
the Cowetas were the most prominent, and many contemporaries considered the Coweta 
chief as the “emperor” of the entire confederacy. Three factions of Upper Creeks 
inhabited a sizable area encompassing the upper Alabama River, the Tallapoosa River, 
and the Coosa River. Appropriately, the Carolinians knew the Upper Creeks by the 
names of these geographical divisions. This branch of the confederation consisted of 
about thirty towns, well over four thousand people, and about 1,350 fighting men.14 
The Cherokee nation, significantly larger than the Creek confederacy, sat astride a range 
of the Blue Ridge Mountains and was divided into four groups: the lower towns, the
13 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 5.
14 Crane, The Southern Frontier, 133-35.
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middle towns, the valley towns, and the overhill towns. In 1721, the Cherokees could 
boast sixty towns in all, with a population over 10,300, of whom some 3,500 were men.15
By the first decade of the eighteenth century, these two great Indian nations, along 
with the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Yamasees, found themselves occupying a region 
between the settlements of British, French, and Spanish colonists. These European 
powers coveted the Indian trade, not only for the wealth and protection it provided, but 
also because it deprived the others of that same wealth and protection. The Indians, then, 
held the balance of power, for wherever the majority of their trading loyalties lay, so did 
the advantage in this unfolding intercolonial struggle. By the early eighteenth century, 
that advantage lay with the British in South Carolina. The extensive Charles Town Indian 
trade was certainly advantageous to South Carolina and the British Empire commercially, 
but more importantly, many of these Indians grew to become dependent on English trade 
goods, mainly “coarse woolen cloths and hardware imported from Great Britain.” The 
Indians likely had no more love for the English than for the French or Spanish, but as 
Vemer Crane argued, “only the excellence of the British trade counterbalanced the 
superior position and diplomacy of the Spanish and the French.”16 It was simply a matter 
of Indian deerskins bringing a better price in England, allowing the traders, in turn, to pay 
more for them. “[Ijndeed that accidental Advantage has proved of more service than any 
presents given by the British Nation or Colonies which are in no respect equal to what is 
given by the French or Spaniards.”17 Upon these trade relations Carolina built a system of 
alliances as its first line of defense. “Guarding each of the principal entrances into the
15 Ibid., 128-132..
16 Ibid., 115.
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colony was a friendly Indian sentry-town, protecting the settlers from attacks by enemy 
Indians,” as well as from the Spanish and French.18 In light of South Carolina’s violent 
history, this bulwark of Indians was even more valuable than the goods acquired in the 
trade. The South Carolina Gazette recognized its significance, reporting in 1736 that 
“The Indian trade is of the greatest Importance to the Wellfare of this Province . . .  as it is 
the Means by which we keep and maintain the several Nations of the Indians surrounding 
this Province in Amity and Friendship with us, and thereby prevent their falling into the 
Interest of France or Spain.”19 In 1715, however, this human barrier came crashing down 
on the Carolinians.
From the beginning of South Carolina’s history, her governing Lords Proprietor 
had endeavored to promote peaceful relations with neighboring Indians through a trade 
policy regulated by the colonial government. By 1707, however, a developing class of 
merchants, through representation in South Carolina’s Commons House, managed to gain 
control over the regulation of the Indian trade, formerly held by the upper house. The 
trade had become an interest “second only to the exportation of rice” and one in which 
most Charles Town merchants were involved. The Commons implemented a system of 
regulation involving a board of commissioners, which was responsible for granting and 
revoking trading licenses, a secretary, and an agent. The agent held the real power, for he 
lived among the Indians with instructions to supervise the traders’ morals, uphold their 
influence over the Indians, preserve peace between tribes in the Carolina alliance, and 
“convert as many Nations of Indians as possible” to friendship with Carolina. The
17 James Crokatt, memorial to the Board of Trade, 10 Nov. 1752, quoted in Crane, 115.
18 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 5.
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problem with this system was the traders themselves. Many of them engaged in abusive 
practices: enslaving free Indians, selling rum to Indians, supplying hostile Indians with 
ammunition, allowing the great accumulation of Indian debt, and operating without 
licenses. These abuses came to the attention of the Commons, which planned a general 
reformation, but as Crane so eloquently put it, “the Indians within a few months
90undertook a reformation of the trade in their own drastic and terrible fashion.”
Yamasee warriors attacked Pocotaligo Town on 15 April 1715, and since the 
Yamasee alliance was essential to the defense of the southern border, their initial attack 
on Carolina traders and settlements was all the more shocking to the British. Although 
the plot was likely initiated by Emperor Brims of Coweta, it soon involved a huge 
conspiracy of Upper and Lower Creeks and Choctaws, as well as Yamasees. Most 
disturbing, however, were reports that the Cherokees, thought to be firm allies, had joined 
in the assault. In one stroke, the attackers killed traders and destroyed the border
91settlements, sending a flood of refugees into Charles Town. The Creeks then broke 
through South Carolina’s defenses and destroyed many plantations southwest of Charles 
Town.22 The attacks came as a response to the abuses that many Indians had suffered at 
the hands of traders which had not been redressed by the trading commission.
Quick and effective response by Carolina and Virginia militia, in conjunction with 
timely diplomacy, saved South Carolina from complete destruction. The attackers were 
quickly beaten back and efforts were made to regain the friendship and aid of Carolina’s
19 Crane, The Southern Frontier, 115.
20 Ibid., 120-21, 152-53.
21 Ibid., 162-70.
22 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 6.
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former allies. The Chickasaws held firm to their English alliance, and the Cherokees 
reaffirmed their friendship only after a courageous expedition into the heart of their 
territory by Colonel Maurice Moore and three hundred men. 23 Only the Creeks and 
Yamasees remained hostile to the British. The Lower Creeks migrated westward to the 
Chatahoochee River, and although they soon reached an official peace agreement with the 
British, they pursued a policy of neutrality and opened trade with the French. The 
Yamasees abandoned their lands in what would soon become Georgia, retreating to the 
protection of the fort at St. Augustine, in Spanish Florida, where they received goods and 
ammunition from the Spaniards.
As a result of the war and subsequent migrations, South Carolina’s position by 
1720 was precarious indeed. The shield of friendly Indian sentry-towns had disappeared, 
and many of these same Indians, particularly Creeks and Yamasees, now posed a threat. 
The southern frontier had been depopulated by the Indian attacks, and for years remained 
vulnerable to Yamasee raids. Much of the Indian trade and the influence that it allowed 
were lost. Over the course of the next decade, South Carolina’s efforts focused on 
rebuilding a protective network of Indian alliances through trade. British negotiators and 
traders eventually succeeded in reconvincing Emperor Brims of the superiority of British 
trade and in establishing a somewhat stable alliance with both the Upper and Lower
23 Crane, The Southern Frontier, 180-82. Before this expedition, the Cherokees had 
agreed to a treaty of alliance and aid against the Creeks, but then hesitated to cooperate. 
Moore’s expedition revealed a division within the Cherokee nation, but produced a peace 
summit between the Carolinians, the Cherokees, the Creeks, and the Yamasees. The 
Creek delegation was three weeks late in arriving, and when it did arrive, its members 
attempted to persuade the Cherokees to join them in an attack on the Carolinian army that 
would likely have been fatal to that colony. The Cherokees responded by massacring the
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Creek towns. This was aided by a crushing British victory in 1728 over the Yamasees, 
who, after refusing to re-ally with the British, were saved from total destruction only by 
retreating to the safety of St. Augustine’s guns. The Cherokees, although courted heavily 
by the French, recommitted to British loyalty, even sending a delegation to England in 
1730, where they signed a treaty of alliance submitting to the Crown’s authority.
Worse yet were the implications that the Yamasee War had for British relations 
with the Spanish and French. Adding support to rumors that they had instigated the war, 
it became clear that neither of these powers had failed to take advantage of South 
Carolina’s weakened position. The Spanish, “from negligible rivals, had become 
formidable contenders for the alliance of the Creek Indians,” in turn strengthening the 
Creek bargaining position.24 Considered more an immediate threat to South Carolina, 
however, were the French. French colonists established the small colony of Louisiana in 
1698, and, supported by an alliance with the Choctaws, resisted South Carolina’s efforts 
to drive them out during Queen Anne’s War (1701-13 ). Now, they took advantage of 
this latest war by making great diplomatic inroads with the Upper Creeks, who allowed 
the construction of Fort Toulouse among the Alabamas. The construction of this fort in 
1717 convinced the Carolinians of French expansionist intentions and raised the fear that 
the French had plans to “isolate the British colonies against the Atlantic coast by a fence
9 ^of garrisoned forts.”
Creek and Yamasee emissaries, and the divisions and hesitations among them 
disappeared.
24 Ibid., 185.
25 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 1.
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In the early days of the Yamasee War, colonial governors from New York to 
South Carolina were on the verge of panic, fearing a general Indian uprising, supported by 
the French, against all the British colonies. In the face of this threat, the Carolina 
assembly sent agents to London to inform the Board of Trade of South Carolina’s 
position as a frontier and potential “bulwark to all his Majesties Collonys on the South 
West part of the Continent against the French, Spaniards and Indians.” They also related 
the fear of French encirclement, describing “the Designs of the French to Extend their 
Settlements form Canada to Mississippi behind the British Plantations.” Governor 
Alexander Spotswood of the royal colony of Virginia expressed similar fears when he 
wrote to the Board regarding the danger of French encirclement if they completed “their 
connections from Canada to the Gulf [of Mexico].” William Keith, deputy-govemor of 
Pennsylvania, was also convinced of French plans to draw a circle around the British 
colonies and expel them from the continent, and he too expressed his concerns to the 
home government. Colonel Robert Johnson, one-time governor of South Carolina, wrote 
to the Board that if war with France reopened, Carolina “would fall an easy Prey to them
and very probably Virginia, New York, and the other Plantations to which this Colony is
• 0(\ a Frontier, would feel the effects of the French growing so powerfull in America.”
Even private individuals in England recognized the value of the southern colonies 
and the danger that they faced. Joshua Gee, a London merchant wrote as late as 1729 
describing Carolina as “the most improveable, in my Apprehension, of any of our 
Colonies; yet because it is the Property of particular Persons [the Lords Proprietors], 
supplies us with little more than one Commodity of Rice (tho’ it is capable of many other
26 Crane, The Southern Frontier, 209-27.
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valuable ones) and is liable to be overrun by the French, Spaniards, and Indians, for want 
of a sufficient Protection.”27 Whether or not the French did indeed have such grandiose 
imperial plans is irrelevant. The fact that so many colonial leaders feared French 
expansion and recognized the relative defenselessness of South Carolina after the 
Yamasee War was enough to call to the attention of the Board of Trade and the Crown 
the need to increase defenses along the Savannah River.
In addition to the efforts at restoring the Indian trade alliances, the South Carolina 
government developed a system of frontier defense consisting of several small forts 
guarding the major land and water entrances to the colony. These forts were supported by 
three ranger companies, “who patrolled the forest paths on horseback” and were stationed 
at plantations guarding the northern, western, and southern approaches to Charles Town. 
This system only included about one hundred men, and although it was probably 
sufficient to guard against Indian attack, any sizable French assault or effort to fortify the 
area south of the Savannah could not be repelled by this tiny force. The only effective 
way to defend the southern frontier from French encroachment was to settle and fortify 
the lands south of the Savannah, before the French did. As early as 1717, a Scottish 
baronet, Sir Robert Montgomery, proposed a new colony between the Savannah and 
Altamaha Rivers, to consist of “compact fortified settlements.”29 Accepted by both the 
Proprietors and the Board of Trade, the project nonetheless faltered for lack of investors 
and disappeared by 1720.
27 Ibid., 315.
28 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 7.
29 Crane, The Southern Frontier, 211.
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In that year, Colonel John Barnwell, an experienced South Carolina soldier, 
approached the British government with a plan to settle and fortify the frontier that 
included the provision by the government of a battalion of regular British soldiers to help 
build a “screen of forts to counter French expansion.”30 Prompted by the Lords 
Proprietors’ closing their land grant office in 1719, as well as their apparent inability to 
provide for southern defense, the colonial government of Carolina persuaded the 
Proprietors to give over provisional control of the colony to the Crown. The Carolinians 
hoped that the royal government would prove more receptive to Carolina’s petitions for 
defense. The Crown did, in fact, accept Barnwell’s plan and in 1721 the first of these 
fortifications, Fort King George, was erected at the mouth of the Altamaha. Barnwell had 
argued, apparently effectively, that the French planned to claim a right to that river. 
“Therefore,” he recommended, “it wou’d be more immediately necessary for Us to
n i
possess ourselves of the Mouth of that River.” The remainder of the plan never came to 
fruition and even Fort King George proved useless because the Crown provided not an 
effective fighting force but a single company of one hundred invalids, half of them ill 
with scurvy. Due to increased Yamasee raids before their defeat in 1728, this garrison 
was withdrawn north of the Savannah, leaving the frontier all but unguarded once again.32
30 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 7.
31 Journal o f the Board o f Trade 16 Aug. 1720, quoted in Crane, 229.
32 Yet another attempt at colonizing south of the Savannah was undertaken in 1724, this 
time by a Swiss entrepreneur named Jean Pierre Purry, who proposed a Swiss colony 
upon the southern boundary. Furthermore, he proposed that the English should secure the 
area that he called an American Paradise, both to strengthen South Carolina and to serve 
as a barrier colony. As had previous such attempts, this one failed, not for lack of support 
from the Carolina Assembly, which was nearly desperate for improved defense, nor from 
disapproval by the Board of Trade, but from the obstacles created by the Lords 
Proprietors, who still held title to the colony's charter.
19
Although Fort King George failed to provide adequate defense along the southern 
frontier, it succeeded in reviving a long-dormant border dispute between Britain and 
Spain. The British built the fort in response to a perceived French threat, but in so doing 
they intensified what had only been a nominal Spanish threat, bringing Spain squarely 
into the three-way intercolonial struggle for supremacy in North America. This struggle 
would not end until 1763 with the expulsion of the French and Spanish from much of the 
continent. The Spanish had settled at St. Augustine a century before the arrival of British 
colonists in Carolina and had also established the mission province of Guale in the 
Altamaha region. Of course, animosity between England and Spain was not new to the 
eighteenth century, and they shared “a common dislike stemming from religious 
differences and imperial clashes.” England’s power was on the rise and Spain’s on the 
decline by the late seventeenth century when conflict erupted between the two 
surrounding a dispute over the proper boundaries of South Carolina, which the English 
claimed extended as far south as the Spanish mission provinces and even St. Augustine. 
The Spaniards responded in 1686 by destroying the two-year-old Scottish settlement of 
Stuart’s Town on Port Royal Island in South Carolina. The Carolinians, in turn, attacked 
St. Augustine at the outbreak of Queen Anne’s War, and although unsuccessful in this 
attack, continued to raid the mission provinces. By the end of the war, Spanish Florida 
was in a “dismal condition” and the Spaniards withdrew into present-day Florida but 
never gave up their claim to Guale. So, when the Carolinians built Fort King George at 
the mouth of the Altamaha, the Spanish saw it as a “flagrant intrusion” into their
33 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 3-4.
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territory.34 For the next several years, negotiations highlighted by Yamasee raids into 
South Carolina, focused on settling this decades old dispute.35 By 1730, the negotiations 
had resolved nothing. The Carolinians clung uncompromisingly to the claim that their 
charter granted them all the land south of the Altamaha, all the way to St. Augustine, even 
going so far as to say that the Spanish had never made attempts to occupy this region.
This claim, of course, ignored the mission provinces. The Spanish, on the other hand, did 
not give up their claim to the same land based on the 1670 Treaty of Madrid, which, if 
enforced, would have restricted the British to the land immediately surrounding Charles 
Town—a concession the Carolinians would never make.
By the end of the 1720s, South Carolinians faced a very dangerous situation: their 
relations with many former Indian allies were shaky at best (relations with the Yamasees 
were completely hostile ), they feared French efforts to encircle them, and they were 
embroiled in a long-standing and intensifying border dispute with the Spanish. The 
Carolina colonial government certainly saw the need for the Crown to incorporate the 
southern frontier into concerns and policies for imperial strategy, but so far, efforts at 
colonizing south of the Savannah had proven unproductive. Many Carolinians attributed 
this failure to the ineptitude of the Lords Proprietors. The shifting of provisional control 
to the Crown in 1719 had at least resulted in the construction of Fort King George and 
had awakened the Crown to the need to protect the southern frontier or face French 
encirclement. Likewise, not until the Proprietors finally relinquished title to the charter,
34 Crane, The Southern Frontier, 238.
35 These raids were put to an end by the British defeat of the Yamasee in 1728 mentioned 
above.
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and thus complete control, of South Carolina in 1729 were positive steps taken to 
sufficiently defend the southern frontier.
The Crown appointed former Proprietary governor Robert Johnson as royal 
governor of South Carolina and he immediately revived Barnwell’s plan for establishing 
townships along the Savannah and Altamaha Rivers. The Board of Trade and the Privy 
Council both approved this plan in its entirety. The reasoning behind the plan was 
articulated by the author of “Reasons for Establishing the Colony of Georgia.” He 
argued: “As towns are established, and grow populous along the rivers Savannah, and 
Alatamaha, they will make such a barrier, as will render the southern provinces of the 
British colonies on the continent of America, safe from Indian, and other enemies.”36 
Johnson recognized the need to achieve three goals in order to secure the frontier: 
friendship with the Indians (particularly the Cherokees), military organization and
' X lfortification, and more white settlers. In just a few years, Oglethorpe would adopt and 
pursue these same goals in his efforts to secure the new colony of Georgia.
In accordance to Johnson’s plan, the Board of Trade ordered the establishment of 
eleven townships, seven north of the Savannah, two on the Savannah, and two on the 
Altamaha. Only nine were actually established immediately, and all of them lay north of 
the Savannah, within the present boundaries of South Carolina. The Carolinians, 
unwilling to extend the frontier south and west of the Savannah River and face certain 
conflict with the Spaniards, did not establish the prescribed Altamaha townships.38 The
36 CGHS1, 224.
37 Crane, The Southern Frontier, 292.
38 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 10.
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building of these settlements would have to wait for the founding of Georgia and the 
coming of Oglethorpe’s Highlanders.
The same year (1730) that the Board of Trade instructed Governor Johnson to 
colonize the Savannah and Altamaha Rivers, the plan for southern frontier defense 
converged with the philanthropic project led by Oglethorpe, John, Lord Percival, and Dr. 
Thomas Bray. The philanthropists’ project of establishing a charitable colony fit nicely 
with the acknowledged need for defense. The common failing of earlier attempts to 
colonize south of the Savannah was the lack of a sufficient supply of colonists and of 
national support. With the emergence of a strong and organized philanthropic movement, 
the needed impulse was added to the imperialistic goals of Carolina and the British 
government. These separate endeavors merged not just through fortunate happenstance 
but through the concerted efforts of members of the Board of Trade and the 
philanthropists.
Bray and Oglethorpe acted out of charity and a desire for social reform, but they 
both certainly understood the need for frontier defense. Bray, who was interested in 
establishing Christian missions in Indian territories, realized that this method would build 
up a barrier between British settlements and “barbarous Indians.” Oglethorpe, serving as 
chairman of the committee investigating prison conditions, saw the opportunity to pursue 
social reform, but within the context of his other interest in developing British colonies.
In fact, he first suggested the idea of a charitable colony in America during a meeting 
with Percival in February 1730. Percival recorded the scheme in his diary, which was to 
obtain land in America, either by purchase or government grant, “and to plant thereon a 
hundred miserable wretches who being let out of gaol . . .  are now starving about the
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town for want of employment.. . [I]n time they with their families would increase so fast 
as to become a security and defence of our possessions against the French and Indians of 
those parts.”39
No individual had yet mentioned a precise location for a colony of this sort. 
However, Oglethorpe and Percival met again just two weeks after the Board of Trade 
issued its settlement instructions to Governor Johnson. At this meeting, they made the 
first specific mention of the Carolina region as a potential site for their colony. Add to 
this the fact that for the previous three months members of the Board of Trade had 
worked with Oglethorpe in his prison investigations, and “the process whereby the 
charitable colony came to be fixed in that segment of the frontier, and assimilated for a 
time to the Bamwell-Johnson township scheme, becomes fairly obvious.”40 The two 
projects converged: the need for defense provided the vehicle through which the 
charitable colony came into being, and the philanthropic project provided the colonists 
needed to secure the southern frontier. Imperialistic needs for defense determined the 
precise location of Oglethorpe’s colony. The philanthropists signed a petition to the king 
and Privy Council on 30 July 1730 requesting a grant of land south and west of the 
Savannah.
The request for land that would become Georgia was the continuation, extension, 
and final fulfillment of both Carolinian expansion and defense policies and British 
imperialistic anti-French and anti-Spanish policies. Philanthropy made the founding of 
Georgia possible, but the new colony came to fruition as a strategic imperialistic move.
39 Crane, The Southern Frontier, 308, 314.
40 Ibid. 318.
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The importance of Georgia’s founding must be viewed within this strategic context, for 
defense soon became the primary goal of the Georgia Trustees and of Oglethorpe himself.
Ill
The British Crown granted the philanthropists’ request in 1732, establishing 
Georgia as a military barrier colony. Pursuant to this goal, the rules and laws established 
by both the charter and the Trustees aimed at providing for the defense of the new colony, 
which contained all of the land between the Savannah and Altamaha Rivers and west 
from the heads of these rivers. The charter granted the Trustees control of the military 
organization of the colony, giving them the power to appoint officers “to train, instruct, 
exercise and govern, a Militia, for the special Defence and Safety of the said Colony, to 
assemble in martial Array, and put in warlike Posture the Inhabitants of the said Colony.” 
More military provisions were prescribed, instructing the Trustees to “erect Forts, and 
fortify any Place or Places within the said Colony, and the same to furnish with all 
necessary Ammunition, Provision, and Stores of War, for Offence and Defence.” The 
Trustees could also delegate the authority to “kill, slay, and destroy, and conquer by all 
fitting ways, enterprises and means whatsoever, all and every such person or persons as 
shall at any time hereafter, in any hostile manner, attempt or enterprise the destruction, 
invasion, detriment or annoyance of our said colony.”41
In addition to providing for the organization and operation of the militia and for 
building fortifications, the charter also gave the Trustees great power over settlement and 
land distribution policies. The Trustees could “transport and convey into the said 
Province” any British subjects or foreigners willing to go and grant them land there. The
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system of land distribution established by the Trustees provided for the colony’s defense 
in a not much more subtle manner than did the building of forts. The Trustees 
“consider’d each Inhabitant, both as a Planter and as a Soldier; and they were therefore to 
be provided with Arms for their Defence, as well as tools for their Cultivation, and to be 
taught the Exercise of both. And as the Military Strength of the Province was particularly 
to be taken care of,” land was granted in fifty acre lots, each “considered as a military 
Fief,” which the grantees could not buy or sell, preventing the accumulation of more than 
one lot per person. The Trustees feared that any large accumulation of land would 
diminish the number of men in the settlement, thus diminishing the colony’s defensive 
capabilities. Each lot was granted in tail male, which meant that only male heirs could 
inherent. This policy, too, aimed at defense, for the Trustees were wary of women 
owning land because they were “incapable . . .  to act as Soldiers.” The Trustees planned 
to enlarge the land tenure policy once the province reached a secure state. Finally, towns 
were to be established in close proximity to the farmlands and to operate as the settlers’ 
garrisons.42
In a further effort to provide for Georgia’s security, the Trustees forbade the 
ownership or employ of Negroes, articulating several reasons for this policy. First, the 
cost of a slave equalled the cost of transporting a white man to the colony, and therefore 
denied the colony an additional planter-soldier. Second, the Spaniards at St. Augustine 
would try to entice slaves to escape or, worse yet, to revolt. Third, if those who 
emigrated at their own expense were allowed to purchase slaves, those poor who
41 Charter of the Colony, CRG 1, 24-25.
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depended on the charity of the Trustees and upon whom the defense of the colony 
depended would leave Georgia when they were refused slaves of their own. Fourth, if 
Georgians possessed Negroes, it would “facilitate the Desertion of the Carolina Negroes, 
thro’ the Province of Georgia; and consequently this Colony, instead of proving a 
Frontier, and adding a Strength to the Province of South Carolina, would be a Means of 
drawing off the slaves of Carolina, and adding thereby a Strength to Augustine.”43 
The measures taken for the founding of Georgia, therefore, constituted a 
conscious effort to establish a compact and defensive-minded settlement to secure the 
region between the Savannah and Altamaha Rivers. Often, however, reality can fall far 
short of an ideal. No doubt the Trustees had every intention of making rules that would 
best serve their purposes, but only Oglethorpe ventured to Georgia and had to implement 
and enforce these policies. The wilds of coastal eighteenth-century Georgia proved to be 
understandably different from the refinement of the Trustees’ London offices, but 
Oglethorpe enthusiastically and courageously pursued the goal of securing the infant 
colony, and therefore South Carolina and the other southern colonies, against 
encroachment from French, Spanish, or Indian enemies. By adopting Governor 
Johnson’s three-pronged policy of organizing defenses and fortifications, establishing 
friendly relations with Indians, and increasing the number of white settlers, Oglethorpe 
and his Georgians assumed the full mantle of responsibility for defending British 
America’s southern frontier.
42 This paragraph is a summary of “An Account Showing the Progress of the Colony of 
Georgia,” CRG 3, 372-75.
43 Ibid., 377-78.
27
V
“The Ann Galley, of above 200 Tons, is on the point of sailing from Deptford, for the 
new colony of Georgia, with 35 Families, consisting of Carpenters, Bricklayers, 
Farmers, &c. who take all proper Instruments. The men were learning Military 
Discipline of the Guards, as must all that go thither, and to carry Musquets, Bayonets, 
and Swords, to defend the Colony in case of an attack from the Indians.”44
Thus, the first group of 114 soldier-settlers prepared to make the long journey from 
London to Georgia. The Trustees had hand-picked these people and paid out four pounds 
sterling for each person’s crossing. After some delay, the Ann sailed from Gravesend on 
17 November 1732, and arrived off the coast of Carolina in mid-January 45 While the 
new colonists waited patiently at Beaufort, South Carolina, Oglethorpe, having 
accompanied the settlers, set off to “view the Savannah River” and to locate an acceptable 
site to construct Georgia’s first British settlement. He eventually “fixed upon a healthy 
Situation, about Ten Miles from the Sea. The River here forms an Half-moon, also on the 
South side of which the Banks are about Forty Feet high, and on the Top a Flat, which 
they call a Bluff.” On this bluff, as far from the Spaniards at St. Augustine and as close 
to Carolina as possible, Oglethorpe laid out the town of Savannah.46 The new Georgians 
arrived at the site on the first of February, accompanied by a fifteen-man South Carolina 
ranger company, commanded by the forty-five-year-old Captain James McPherson. 
Governor Johnson of Carolina had ordered McPherson southward from Saltcatchers Fort 
on the Combahee River to Savannah to “Cover and protect that Settlement from any 
insults.”47 The settlers must have reacted to their new environment with a mixture of 
fear, excitement, and awe. Used to the crowded squalor of eighteenth-century London,
44 Gentlemen’s Magazine (London), Oct. 1732, 1029, quoted in Sarah B. G. Temple and 
Kenneth Coleman, Georgia Journeys, (Athens, Ga., 1961) 2.
45 Two infant boys died on the voyage.
46 Oglethorpe to the Trustees, 10 Feb. 1733, CRG 3, 380.
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the “vast Woods of Pine-trees,” many over seventy feet tall, the fresh water of the 
Savannah, the openness of the bluff, and the unobstructed view to the sea must have 
made quite an impression.48
Not to mention the impression McPherson and his rugged Carolina rangers made 
on native Englishmen and women used to the smartly dressed soldiers they had seen in 
England. These rangers, by comparison, rode small mud-splattered Spanish horses— 
accoutered with unpolished saddles—were unshaven after a three-day journey, and wore 
woolen or fox-fur caps and a non-uniform assortment of shirts, waistcoats, coats, and 
buckskin breeches and leggings. They carried flintlock carbines, pistols, knives and 
hatchets—all necessary weapons in the dangerous frontier environment. Despite their 
unsoldierly appearance, the rangers performed their duties with expert efficiency. Many 
of them had served as rangers for four or more years, were veterans of clashes with 
Indians, and had adopted the Indians’ method of warfare. Ranger companies made up the 
backbone of South Carolina’s defenses, patrolling the Yamasee warpaths, and would 
soon serve Georgia as valuable defenders and models for her own defense system.49
With McPherson’s Southern Rangers as protection, Savannah’s founders set 
straight to work building their new town. In accordance with the charter, the Trustees 
supplied those settlers who emigrated on the Trustees’ charity with a musket and bayonet, 
along with tools needed for farming and building settlements. In addition, the Trustees 
required such people to “work and labour in clearing their Lands, making Habitations,
47 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 11.
48 Oglethorpe to the Trustees, 10 Feb. 1733, CRG 3, 381.
49 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 13-16.
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and necessary Defences, and in all other Works for the common Good .”50 And following 
the charter’s instructions regarding land distribution, settlers in town were granted sixty- 
by-ninety-foot lots and those in the country and later in villages received the prescribed 
fifty acres, which were to lie close together. Again, the Trustees felt that such compact 
towns and villages would better suit the needs for defense. More important, however, 
Oglethorpe immediately set the settlers to fortifying Savannah by raising palisades and 
building a battery of cannon, “which command[ed] the River, some Distance below the 
Town.”51 Torrential cold rains that fell that February made this work all the more 
difficult, but Oglethorpe’s enthusiasm and leadership abilities kept the weary settlers at 
their work. They unloaded the boats, felled trees, sowed seeds, and built houses and an 
armory. In short, they hacked a respectable town out of the wilderness. Samuel Eveleigh, 
a Charles Town merchant, visited the infant town in March and published his observances 
in the South Carolina Gazette. “Mr. Oglethorpe is indefatigable, takes a vast deal of 
Pains . . . .  He is extremely well beloved by all his People; the general Title they give him 
is Father . . .  He keeps a strict Discipline . . .  There are no Idlers there . . . .” Eveleigh
C ' l
also remarked on the palisade and the show of small arms and “Five Cannon.”
Faced with the reality of Georgia’s precarious situation and the ever-present threat 
of attack, Oglethorpe soon became completely engrossed in fortifying the entire region. 
Beyond Savannah’s immediate defensive works, he sought to establish stronger and more 
far-reaching defenses, and with the cooperation of South Carolina’s Governor Johnson
50 Rules for the Year 1735, CRG 3, 407-09.
51 “An Account Showing the Progress of the Colony of Georgia,” CRG 3, 382.
52 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 13.
53 South Carolina Gazette, 22 March 1733.
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and that colony’s ranger forces, the Georgia leader quickly secured the southern and 
western approaches to Savannah. By doing so, Oglethorpe sought to fulfill the colony’s 
original purpose: defending the frontier and relieving South Carolinians of the threat of 
attack. McPherson’s rangers were on something of a long-term loan to the Georgians. In 
the summer of 1733, Oglethorpe employed them in building a fort on the banks of the 
Ogeechee River, west of Savannah, to guard an old Yamasee warpath. Although midway 
through the construction they realized that they had obstructed the river with their scrap 
timber and had to start over at a different site, the rangers completed Fort Argyle by 
Christmas of that year. It stood on the west bank of the river and was a typical frontier 
fort—square, with diamond shaped bastions on the landward comers, protected by 
wooden palisades, a dry moat, and earthem walls. Oglethorpe gave McPherson a Georgia 
commission and ordered the rangers to remain at Fort Argyle as a garrison force. The 
abandoned fort remained, referred to as First Fort. Early in 1734, South Carolina sent 
five reinforcements to the rangers under the command of William Elbert, who also 
received a Georgia commission and garrisoned First Fort with half of the now twenty 
rangers.
With the construction of these two forts south of the Savannah, the old South 
Carolina forts became less essential and Governor Johnson ordered more of his rangers to 
Georgia. A company under Aneas Mackintosh, a Scottish gentleman and heir to the 
chiefdom of the Highland Clan Chattan, had been garrisoned at Fort Prince George 
several miles upriver from Savannah, guarding the same Yamasee warpath that Fort 
Argyle now guarded. When McPherson left for Georgia, Johnson ordered Mackintosh to 
reinforce Saltcatchers but soon transferred him again to Fort Argyle, ordering Saltcatchers
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to be burned. Before this order could be carried out, Johnson changed his mind and 
relocated Mackintosh yet again, this time ordering him back to Fort Prince George where 
he had begun. In 1735, when the Carolina Assembly refused to pay for Mackintosh’s 
rangers any longer, Oglethorpe assumed responsibility for them and incorporated them 
into Georgia’s growing forces.
The second of the three prongs of Johnson’s and Oglethorpe’s plan for securing 
the frontier was establishing good relations with Indians. The Georgia colonists certainly 
did not find, nor did they expect to find, an uninhabited land when they arrived. The by­
laws passed by the Trustees show their desire to establish firm alliances and trade with 
the neighboring nations, for they understood, as did Carolina officials, that the key to 
supremacy in the region was friendship with the Indians.54 In 1730, seven Cherokee 
representatives had traveled to England and signed a treaty of alliance. The British had 
always valued the Cherokees’ friendship, since this nation lay between them and many 
hostile tribes to the north, and recognized “the value to the intended colony [Georgia] of 
the amity of the Cherokee.” The treaty acknowledged Cherokee subjection to the British 
Crown, formed military and trading alliances, and forbade the Cherokees to trade with 
other Europeans.55 Before Oglethorpe even set foot on Georgia soil, he could be assured 
of Cherokee friendship, trade, and aid in defense. The region surrounding Savannah, 
however, did not belong to the Cherokees but to the Creeks and Yamasees.
The Georgians did not immediately encounter either of these nations. Instead, 
Oglethorpe wrote of “a little Indian Nation, the only one within Fifty Miles, [which] is
54 By-Laws and Laws of the Colony of Georgia, CRG 1, 31-42.
55 Crane, The Southern Frontier, 297.
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not only at Amity, but desirous to be Subjects to his Majesty King George, to have Lands 
given them among us, and to breed their Children at our Schools.”56 These were the 
Yamacraw Indians, about one hundred people of mixed Creek and Yamasee blood, led by 
an old chief, Tomochichi, who lived on the bluff that the Georgians now occupied.
As prepared as he was to make gifts of friendship to the Yamacraws, Oglethorpe did not 
expect the welcome that the colonists received. A delegation soon came to welcome the 
settlers, “and before them came a Man dancing in Antick Postures with a spread Fan of 
white Feathers in each hand as a Token of friendship . . . Then the King and all the men 
came in a regular manner & Shook [Oglethorpe] by the hand; after that the Queen came
cn
and all the Women did the like.” Tomochichi then presented Oglethorpe with a gift of a 
buffalo skin with an eagle’s head painted on the inside. This symbol stood for the 
superior strength of the English and asked for English protection. Tomochichi also ceded 
the land for Savannah, and Oglethorpe accepted two companies of Yamacraw warriors,
r o
about forty men, into Georgia’s defense forces.
Oglethorpe knew that in order to secure the new settlement he must gain the 
friendship of the more numerous, more powerful, and potentially more dangerous Creeks. 
He also knew that, based on Carolina’s recent shaky relations with the Creeks, obtaining 
a pledge of friendship could be difficult. However, during a meeting with fifty-four 
Lower Creeks, he forged “a treaty of alliance, friendship and commerce, to last as long as 
the sun shines or the waters run in the rivers.” Oglethorpe, pleased with the results,
56 Oglethorpe to the Trustees, 10 Feb. 1733, CRG 3, 380-81.
57 Thomas Causton to his wife , 12 March 1733, quoted in Temple and Coleman, Georgia 
Journeys, 17-18.
58 Temple and Coleman, Georgia Journeys, 17-18.
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wrote, “The Creeks adhere firmly to us.”59 The next year, 1734, several Lower Creeks 
traveled to England in an effort to ensure fair trading practices, which resulted in the 
Trustees’ passing an “Act for maintaining the Peace with the Indians in the Province of 
Georgia.”60 The friendship of the Lower Creeks would prove valuable in future conflict 
with the Spaniards.
The Georgians also attempted to secure the loyalty of the Upper Creeks, who were 
generally friendly toward the British. However, since building Fort Toulouse among the 
Alabamas, the French constantly attempted to gain influence over the remaining two 
Upper Creek factions. If that happened, and the French disrupted the Charles Town 
Indian trade, the British would lose their only source of influence and the Upper Creeks 
might ally with the Choctaws and the French and destroy South Carolina as well as the 
infant colony. The South Carolina Assembly wished to construct a fort to counter Fort 
Toulouse, but sensing that the Upper Creeks would not tolerate Carolina soldiers, 
requested that Oglethorpe direct an expedition to the Upper Creeks and even offered to 
pay for it.
Eager to ally with the Upper Creeks as well as to acquire control over the trade 
with the Creeks inside Georgia’s boundaries, Oglethorpe organized an independent 
company under the command of Patrick Mackay, an indebted Scottish gentleman from 
the Highland county of Sutherland.61 Oglethorpe not only instructed Mackay to negotiate
59 Ibid., 19.
60 “An Account Showing the Progress of the Colony of Georgia,” CRG 3, 384.
61 Mackay had come to Georgia in 1733 with his three brothers, Hugh, James, and 
Charles, and settled upriver from Savannah at Josephs Town. His nephew, Hugh 
Mackay, Jr., was appointed ensign of the new company, and would later serve as 
commander of one of the Highland units organized before the War of Jenkin's Ear.
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with the Upper Creeks for a British fort in the area but gave him the authority to regulate 
traders and require them to obtain a Georgia trading license, instead of the South Carolina 
license many of them already held. Oglethorpe possessed no authority to do this, as the 
Trustees had not yet assumed control over trade. In his defense, however, he recognized 
the need to secure this trade, knowing the strategic benefits it carried. Mackay did 
succeed in building a British fort at Okfuskee, a principal Upper Creek town, but in the 
process he infuriated the South Carolina government in his attempts to exceed his strictly 
military goals. Obtaining part of the Indian trade may have been necessary for Georgia’s 
financial and military survival, but in attempting it, Mackay opened a rift with Carolina 
that never fully healed.
Lastly, Oglethorpe and the Trustees continually sought to reinforce the new 
colony with more immigrants. At the end of the first year of settlement, the settlers sent
COto Georgia on the Trustees’ charity numbered 152. For several years to come, 
Parliament continued to provide funds for increased settlement and the Trustees 
continued to transport individuals, both British and foreign Protestants, just as originally 
planned. By the summer of 1735, the third year of Georgia’s history, the Trustees had 
sent on their charity 574 individuals, including 173 foreign Protestants. A significant
62 As word reached England about the pleasantness and early successes of the colony, 
some amusing events transpired. The Trustees learned that individuals had gone about 
England offering land and money in Georgia in the Trustees' names, but without that 
body's knowledge. The Trustees were forced to publish advertisements in newspapers to 
warn people of these false solicitations, declaring "that they had never given such Power 
to any Persons whatsoever; and that they never used any Solicitations to induce People to 
go over," CRG 3, 383.
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number of individuals emigrated at their own expense as well and received a total of over 
twelve thousand acres.63
By 1735, Georgia could boast three lines of defense. The outermost consisted of 
the two Yamacraw companies responsible for guarding the crossings of the Altamaha 
River, some miles south of Savannah. Behind them, Captain McPherson’s rangers, 
garrisoned at Fort Argyle, patrolled the west bank of the Ogeechee, Lieutenant Elbert’s 
detachment at First Fort patrolled between the Ogeechee and the Savannah, and Captain 
Mackintosh’s Fort Prince George garrison patrolled up and down the east bank of the 
Savannah. The final line of defense was the Georgia militia, consisting of the 397 male 
residents of Savannah and of several small, fortified villages that had sprung up southeast 
and southwest of Savannah. In addition to these land forces, Georgia also had use of the 
scout boat Carolina, which guarded the Inland Passage, the main invasion route from the 
south.
Despite these defenses, Georgians found themselves with a vulnerable southern 
border by 1735. Dependable Indian allies were few, the ranger companies were small and 
spread out, and the tiny militia force lacked efficient organization as well as the firepower 
to repel a significant French or Spanish invasion force. Although Carolina promised 
support from its three thousand-man militia, they were preoccupied with the fear of slave 
revolts and could not be counted on. In 1734, the South Carolina Assembly sent a 
petition to King George relating to him the dangerous position of both South Carolina and 
Georgia. The petition includes descriptions of the “vast Number of French and Indians” 
which threatened the colonies, and reveals the comparative weakness of the combined
63 “An Account Showing the Progress of the Colony of Georgia,” CRGS, 382-86.
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militias of Carolina and Georgia, which amounted to only 3,500 men.64 Although the 
situation had improved and the march colony continued to grow, both Georgians and 
Carolinians still felt vulnerable to attack. Georgia needed more soldier-settlers.
64 Ibid., 413-19.
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CHAPTER II
"To distant climes, a dreary scene they go, 
Where wild Altama murmurs to their woe."1
Ten oar blades quietly churned the turbid water as the large, double-ended, 
cypress scout boat Carolina finally neared its destination, a bluff overlooking the 
swampy Altamaha River less than five miles from where it opens to the sea. The journey 
from St. Simon’s Island had taken three hours, and the oarsmen, although warmed by the 
rowing on this February day, were probably happy to have on board a group of Indian 
warriors willing to share the workload. The crew’s leader had just spent four days on St. 
Simon's beginning the work of building and fortifying the new settlement of Frederica.
He was eager to reach the newest British settlement south of the Savannah River, "the 
Scotch Settlement which they desire may be called Darien."4 The men in the Carolina 
could see activity on the bluff and likely could hear the ring of axes chopping wood and 
the thud of hammers hitting nails. Upon spying the approaching craft, the men of the 
new settlement grabbed their weapons and rushed to the bank to identify the boatmen, for 
they were precariously situated on the very edge of the British empire, vulnerable to 
attack by hostile Spaniards and their Indian allies. The leader of the boat's crew, an 
ambitious and self-confident English aristocrat of thirty-seven years, gazed with pleasure
1 J. P. MacLean, An Historical Account o f the Settlement o f Scotch Highlanders in 
America, (Baltimore, 1968) 152.
> 2 James Hunter, A Dance Called America: The Scottish Highlands, the United States, and 
Canada (Edinburgh and London, 1994), 23-24; Larry E. Ivers, British Drums on the 
Southern Frontier : The Military Colonization o f Georgia, 1733-1749 (Chapel Hill,
1974), 53.
3 Ibid., 54; James Oglethorpe to the Trustees, 27 Feb. 1736, Collections o f the Georgia 
Historical Society 3, pt. 2 (1873), 15.
4 Ibid.
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upon the men coming to meet him. "They were all under Arms upon seeing a Boat, and 
made a most manly appearance with their Plads, broad Swords, Targets [round, leather 
covered, wooden shields] & Fire Arms."5 He spent the night with the Scotsmen, 
disdaining the comfort of the "very good bed" offered him, instead adopting the 
"uncomprimisingly spartan lifestyle" of his Gaelic-speaking hosts by sleeping on the 
ground under a tree wrapped in the wool plaid "Highland habit" which his hosts had 
given him.6
In so doing, James Oglethorpe gained the respect of the settlers of Darien:
Scottish Highlanders, recruited by Oglethorpe himself to leave their native glens and 
moors to settle in this desolate and dangerous comer of the vast British Empire. Enticed 
into occupying the northern bank of the Altamaha River to safeguard the new colony 
from Spanish aggression, they arrived in Georgia in January 1736 and immediately began 
building and fortifying their town. In a month's time, 177 men, women, and children, 
freeholders and indentured servants, had erected "a Battery of 4 pieces of Cannon . . .  a 
Guard house a Store house a Chappel & several Hutts" which Oglethorpe inspected on
n
his first visit. These Highlanders were used to working together, as most had come from 
the area around Inverness and were fellow clansmen. In Georgia they found themselves 
embroiled in the beginnings of a monumental struggle for colonial supremacy and would 
eventually play a significant part in this stmggle and the violent early years of Georgia's 
history.
5 Ibid.
6 Phinizy Spalding, Oglethorpe in America (Chicago, 1977), 27; Hunter, 24.
7 Oglethorpe to the Trustees, 27 Feb. 1736, CGHS 3, 15.
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Oglethorpe had realized the perilous situation on his southern border by 1735 and 
had determined to provide a bulwark against attack by Indians or Spaniards.8 Consumed 
as he was with defending the new colony, he abandoned somewhat his philanthropic 
stance and began to alter his notions of the ideal settler.9 In so doing, Oglethorpe began 
to focus more and more on military affairs and would soon concentrate his efforts on the 
settlements that could best defend themselves, to the detriment of the other settlements 
and to the agrarian equality ideal of the Trustees. The reality of the situation and the dire 
need for more defenses diverged from the original ideal. Oglethorpe had found that poor 
urban workers from London did not suit the need that the frontier environment made 
clear. As Benjamin Martyn, secretary for the Trustees, wrote, "many of the Poor who 
had been useless in England, were inclined to be useless likewise in Georgia."10
Oglethorpe persuaded the Trustees to petition Parliament for more funds to settle 
and secure the southern boundary of the colony. The Trustees agreed, apparently induced 
by the South Carolina Assembly's 1734 letter, as well as the Board of Trade's 
longstanding order to place two settlements on the Altamaha, which Carolina had 
ignored. Parliament granted the Trustees £26,000 sterling for the endeavor, and the 
Trustees, in turn, determined that "these Embarkations should consist chiefly of Persons 
from the Highlands of Scotland" and authorized Oglethorpe to recruit the needed 
settlers.11 Although the Trustees as a body gave the final authorization, it is very likely 
that Oglethorpe himself had suggested the recruitment of Highlanders. Over the next 
several years more than two hundred individuals -  men, women, and children, free and
8 Ibid., 149.
9 Spalding , Oglethorpe in America, 29.
10 “An Account Showing the Progress of the Colony of Georgia,” CRG 3, 387.
11 Ibid.
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indentured -  would cross the ocean from the Highlands of Scotland to settle on the 
Altamaha. Recruited as soldier-settlers, the Highland men fulfilled their duty as 
guardians of the southern frontier. Closely allied with Indians with whom they shared 
much in common, the Scots participated in a short but bloody war with the Spanish that 
saved the colony but very nearly destroyed the Highlander settlement at Darien.
II
Recruiting individuals from the periphery of an empire and using them for
military purposes on another periphery is a practice at least as old as ancient Rome, but
why did Oglethorpe look to the Scottish Highlands for his "tribal levies?"12 Most
Englishmen considered Highlanders as savage as the Indians in America and thought they
posed more of a threat to the empire than an asset. But Oglethorpe was one of the first
Englishmen to see in Highlanders a valuable opportunity for the British imperial cause.
One of the possible reasons Oglethorpe turned to Highlanders was his well-known
Jacobite connections. In addition to having flirted with Jacobitism himself in his youth,
his mother was "an inveterate Jacobite plotter," and his sisters had married French
aristocrats and exiled themselves to France "rather than risk the horrors of life in an
1 ^England no longer controlled by the Stuarts."
A more persuasive reason, however, was the Highlanders' reputation. Oglethorpe 
needed a homogeneous and tight-knit group of people able to survive in an isolated and 
harsh environment and capable of effective military action. Highlanders were hardy, 
warlike, reliable, and loyal to their leaders and fellow clansmen -- just the kind of people
12 Hunter, A Dance Called America, 24.
13 Spalding, Oglethorpe in America, 2; Beyond political sentiments, Oglethorpe possessed 
a certain affinity for Highland culture, demonstrated by his purchase of a Gaelic 
grammar.
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needed to safeguard the southern border. The harsh and uninviting Highland 
environment dictated the character of those living in it. Dr. Samuel Johnson, who 
traveled Scotland extensively, described the Highlands as haunted by the phantoms of 
’’want, and misery, and danger."14 Universally barren, the region was not conducive to 
profitable agriculture or commerce, forcing much of the population to live in relative 
poverty.
Inhabitants were able to grow such imported American crops as com and 
potatoes, but the Highland economy was based largely on subsistence level cattle herding 
— a system known as shieling. In this system, families were responsible for tending their 
own cattle and producing butter, cheese, and, most of which was consumed by the family. 
Large cattle drives to market towns in the Lowlands or even across the border into 
England were not uncommon and often brought a fair profit to the families who 
contributed to the herd. Probably the largest Highland industry, however, was the timber 
industry. By the eighteenth century, the Highlands were becoming largely deforested in 
order to supply the Royal Navy with timber. The work patterns of both the cattle and 
timber industries closely followed, and were largely dictated by, the seasons; Highlanders 
were very attuned to their natural environment and relied more on natural signs than 
exact dates for their agricultural work.
The houses of commoners were often crude, small, and ill-furnished, and before 
1720 the lack of roads suitable for carrying carriages and coaches through the mountains 
helped to isolate the region from the growing British economic and political system and 
kept the inhabitants "secluded from the rest of mankind." Highlanders, however, adapted 
well to their isolation. Describing the rugged landscape, Johnson said it was "the
14 Pat Rogers, Johnson and Boswell in Scotland (New Haven , 1993) 89.
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consequence of a form of life inured to hardships, and therefore not studious of nice 
accommodations." He elaborated, remarking that Highlanders lacked "not only the 
elegancies, but the conveniences of common life."15 Apparently, this situation embued 
pride in these people, for a Highlander writing to the Trustees claimed that his people 
were "used to hardships: what they reckon comforts are very simple."16
The Highlands not only encouraged hardiness in their inhabitants, they produced a 
violent tribal way of life. Johnson described how the mountainous terrain divided the 
people into "petty nations, which are made by a thousand causes enemies to each other. 
Each will exalt its own chiefs, each will boast the valour of its men . . . and every claim 
of superiority irritates competition; injuries will sometimes be done, and . . . retaliation
ITwill sometimes be attempted, and the debt exacted with too much interest." These
"petty nations" or clans were "socially unified and militarily effective organization[s]"
which had existed for centuries in the Highlands and were a combination of the ancient
1 8Celtic tribal system and Norman feudalism. Traditionally based upon kinship ties, by 
the early modem period the clan existed as a land-holding system centered on a chief 
who collected rent (often in the form of livestock) from tenants. These tenants, in turn, 
collected rent from sub-tenants — crofters — who held small strips of land for subsistence 
farming. Provided that the chief fulfilled his patriarchal duties of protecting and 
maintaining his clansmen, he enjoyed their submission, loyalty, and military service
15 Ibid., 69, 98, 117, 67.
16 Daniel McLachlan to the Trustees, 26 Feb. 1737, in K. G. Davies, ed., Calendar o f  
State Papers, Vol. XLIII, (London, 1963), 112.
17 Rogers, Johnson and Boswell in Scotland, 94.
18 Margaret MacDonell, The Emigrant Experience: Songs o f Highland Emigrants in 
North America, (Toronto, 1982), 5, quoting James Hunter, name of work unknown.
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whenever he deemed it necessary to defend against an external threat. Johnson alluded to
such threats when he noted the frequency of inter-clan rivalry, wars, and invasions:
"Mountaineers are warlike, because by their feuds and competitions they 
consider themselves as surrounded with enemies, and are always prepared 
to repel incursions, or to make them .. . [they] soon consider all as 
enemies, whom they do not reckon as friends, and think themselves 
licensed to invade whatever they are not obliged to protect. . . Among a 
warlike people, the quality of highest esteem is personal courage."19
"Every person wished to be thought a soldier," and James Boswell, Johnson's
Lowland Scots travelling companion, respected their courage, despite their "thoughtless
J Oinclination for war." They employed the traditional weapons of the Highlands —
broadswords, bows, spears, dirks, axes, and targets — and many gentlemen could use
them with great skill; the commoners relied on violence, courage, and the fear they struck
into the hearts of their enemies.
"[I]t is well known, that the onset of the Highlanders was very formidable.
As an army cannot consist of philosophers, a panic is easily excited by any 
unwonted mode of annoyance. New dangers are naturally magnified; and 
men accustomed only to exchange bullets at a distance, and rather to hear 
their enemies than see them, are discouraged and amazed when they find 
themselves encountered hand to hand, and catch the gleam of steel
J  iflashing in their faces."
Highlanders, therefore, seemed the perfect individuals to place in an isolated 
settlement along the Altamaha where armed conflict with the Spanish was inevitable. 
They were "ignorantly proud and habitually violent, unconnected with the general 
system, and accustomed to reverance only their own lords." Not only were they fearsome 
and effective warriors, they responded well to authority, as long as that authority was 
their own chief. The Georgian frontier environment would provide the Highlanders with
19 Rogers, Johnson and Boswell in Scotland, 139, 96.
20 Grady McWhiney, Celtic Culture in the Old South (Tuscaloosa, 1988) 151; Rogers, 
Johnson and Boswell in Scotland, 193, 82.
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familiar surroundings, where their hardy adaptability and fighting skills would not grow 
dull. "For a campaign in the wastes of America, soldiers better qualified could not have 
been found."22
Ill
“We are now in America,
99In the shade of the never-ending forest”
Hoping to recruit several warlike Highlanders, Oglethorpe and the Trustees 
"ordered Mr. Hugh Mackay & Mr. [William] Dunbar to raise 100 Men free or servants 
and for that purpose allowed to them the free passage of ten servants over & above the 
100. They farther allowed them to take 50 Head of Women & Children."24 The freemen 
were to be "of Gentlemen's families and of good reputation, industrious, laborious, brave
9 cand speaking the Highland language."
The summer of 1735 proved a profitable time for those seeking emigrants from 
the Scottish Highlands. The combination of several factors — economic, political, social, 
and cultural — made emigration to America seem to gentleman and commoner alike a 
good idea indeed. Following the 1715 Jacobite Rising the new Hanoverian government 
sought to reduce the Jacobite threat by modernizing and commercializing Highland 
society and economy. The traditional Highland way of life became threatened by 
increased trade with the outside world, the building of military roads, the advent of a cash 
economy, and the government's efforts to undermine the traditional relationship between
21 Ibid., 210.
22 Ibid., 97, 187.
23 Quoted from a poem by John Macrae (??-cl780), “Sleep Softly, My Darling Beloved,” 
found in MacDonell, The Emigrant Experience, 43.
24 Oglethorpe to the Trustees, 13 Feb. 1736, CGHS 3,10.
25 David Dobson, Scottish Emigration to Colonial America, 1607-178, (Athens, Ga., 
1994), 118-19.
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chiefs and their clansmen by commuting rents to cash, making it difficult for cash-poor 
tenants to pay. Tenants began to regard their chief not as the traditional clan patriarch but 
as a landlord caught up in the new commercialization of the Highland economy; tenants 
were "caught between two conflicting ideologies of traditional culture with familiar 
expectations and modem commercialism with unknown pressures." They found their 
landholdings divided and rents increased. Migration, not only overseas but to Lowland 
and English cities, became a common response.26 Further modernization came in the 
form of increased industry. In addition to expanding traditional timber and fishing 
industries, iron ore mining became widespread in certain regions.
Highland culture was directly attacked as well. A 1716 act of Parliament 
disarmed the clans, denying them their warrior tradition. And the newly formed Society 
in Scotland for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge ambitiously sought to root out 
the Catholic and Gaelic "superstitions" practiced by many Highlanders. Gaelic 
Highlanders, then, felt their way of life threatened from all sides and saw emigration to 
America as an opportunity to preserve their culture, social structure, and economy.
Mackay and Dunbar recruited emigrants "according to the Custom of that 
Country." The "Custom" was to "bring the enterprise into vogue with the chief 
gentlemen," who then convinced members of the clan to join the emigration.
Highlanders followed the instructions of their clan leaders and would not emigrate 
without their approval, nor without the companionship of their own people.27 In fact, this 
clan structure proved an obstacle to Mackay's efforts since some chiefs did not want to 
lose rent-paying tenants. A second obstacle to recruiting concerned the Trustees'
26 Anthony Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia: The Recruitment, 
Emigration, and Settlement at Darien, 1735-1748, (Athens, Ga., 1997), 35.
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insistence on inheritance by tail male, which prevented the traditional Highland 
allowance of inheritance by daughters and wives. Lastly, many Highlanders were aware 
of the practice of shanghaiing hapless young men by leading them to believe they were 
going to mainland America, when in reality they were destined for the sugar fields of 
Jamaica.
Mackay met with his largest success, not surprisingly, among his own clansmen 
in the county of Sutherland where the staunchly Hanoverian Mackays responded so
• * T Owillingly as to make up the majority of their kinsman's 71 recruits. Dunbar, in contrast, 
spent his efforts recruiting among the large and renowned Jacobite Clan Chattan ("Clan 
of the Cat") near the town of Inverness, an area described as one of "most romantic and
9Qbeautiful scenery" but holding "no possibility of cultivation." Eventually this clan 
provided the majority of the emigrants, and gentlemen of the clan, particularly John Mohr 
(Big John) Mackintosh, assumed leadership of all the recruits, Hanoverian and Jacobite 
alike. The fact that these groups of starkly different political loyalties could serve 
together might lead one to conclude that Highlanders were actually fickle in their loyalty. 
The more accurate assessment, though, would be that these individuals were recruited for 
a specific purpose and, once they aligned themselves with that endeavor and its leaders, 
their primary loyalty now lay with it.
Chattan was an old clan, led since the thirteenth century by the chieftain of one of
on
its seventeen septs (or tribes) — Mackintosh. The clan chief, therefore, was known as 
Mackintosh of Mackintosh and was apparently eager to send some of his kinsmen to
27 Oglethorpe to the Trustees, 13 Feb. 1736, CGHS 3, 10-11.
28 Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia, 42.
29 Thomas Pennant, A Tour in Scotland, 1769, (Perth, 1979), 196-97.
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Georgia to join his own brother, Aneas Mackintosh, already commander of a Carolina 
ranger company helping to defend the new Georgian settlements.
The Inverness town council perceived emigration to America as such a welcome 
opportunity that they made Oglethorpe an honorary burgess. And British authorities saw 
no objection, since Clan Chattan openly supported the Jacobite cause; sending them to 
Georgia would mean one less troublesome group of Highlanders to oppose Hanoverian 
rule.
In the end Mackay and Dunbar enlisted 163 individuals willing to leave their
homes. Although the complete list of individuals in this group of Scottish emigrants does
not survive, the names, ages, and occupations of several of the original Highland
colonists do remain. The majority were young men in their late teens or twenties,
although there were a number of families. A few were gentlemen; most were laborers,
farmers, or servants indentured to the Trustees or to private gentlemen. The trades
^ |
represented were apothecary, tailor, cooper, joiner, weaver, and surgeon. This 
demographic make-up fits well with the Trustees' ideal. Not only were most of the 
recruits young men capable of serving as soldiers, but the presence of women and 
children added a stabilizing element to the new community, while the range of 
occupations ensured that the Scottish settlement would be self-sufficient. One has to 
wonder, however, about the compatibility of the goals of establishing stable families and 
securing an effective military force. In retrospect, at least, the two proved mutually 
exclusive: the Highlanders succeeded in their purpose of providing a defense for Georgia 
but at the expense of the welfare of the Darien settlement. One has to be careful not to
30 Frank Adam, The Clans, Septs, and Regiments o f the Scottish Highlands, revised ed., 
(Edinburg, 1952), 208.
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romanticize the Trustees' (or even Oglethorpe's) regard for the Highlanders, who were 
recruited specifically for defensive purposes and as such were probably viewed by the
99Trustees as expendable.
The recruits set sail aboard the Prince o f Wales from Inverness in October 1735, 
no doubt feeling a twinge of sorrow as they watched their native hills fade in the distance. 
At the same time, they were setting forth on a grand adventure, in which "[t]he prospect
T9of a noble fight for a worthy cause was incentive enough." They arrived in Tybee 
Road, at the mouth of the Savannah River, in January 1736. Upon landing, a group of 
Carolinians tried to discourage them, warning that the Spaniards would shoot them before 
they could build their settlement. "Why then said the Highland men we will beat them 
out of their Fort & shall have Houses ready built to live in."34 Apparently the new 
colonists had not lost their inclination for fighting or their bravado.
Several days passed before enough boats could be found to ferry the Highlanders 
down the Inland Passage to their new home on the Altamaha, which they named Darien, 
in honor of a failed Scottish settlement in Panama. The site was that of old Fort King 
George, abandoned nearly ten years earlier and lying in neglect since the Carolinians had 
refused to settle the area. According to Oglethorpe, the new settlers numbered 177, 
having added several after their original muster at Inverness. As allowed by the Trustees, 
146 traveled on charity, while seventeen gentlemen paid their own way as well as the 
passage of some personal servants.
31 Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia, appendix B, 107-125.
32 Anthony Parker, in his work Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia, fails to 
recognize this possibility.
33 Edward J. Cashin, Lachlan McGillivary, Indian Trader (Athens, Ga., 1992), 14.
34 Oglethorpe to the Trustees 27 Feb. 1736, CGHS 3, 15.
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The Highlanders were subject to the same rules as other Georgians. The freemen 
among them received fifty acres of land, and each servant received a promise of twenty 
acres upon completion of his indenture. The Trustees provided well for the servants, 
supplying them with food, clothing, and weapons, which must have been quite attractive 
to tenants barely surviving at home. But it is strange that the Trustees did not provide the 
Scots with any farming implements. The only tools specifically mentioned as going to 
the Highlanders were shovels and pickaxes — tools better employed in building 
fortifications than growing corn. The Trustees were fooling themselves if they really 
expected the Scots to fend off the Spaniards and maintain successful family farms at the 
same time, especially with no provision for cheap labor (slaves were prohibited in 
Georgia).
Since the Highlanders were there specifically to serve as soldiers, and in the 
tradition of their people, they received muskets, broadswords, axes, and targets, as well as 
Highland plaids. During their first three weeks in Georgia, the Highlanders busied 
themselves building their new home. Upon the ruins of Fort King George, they 
constructed the battery, guard house, chapel, and huts that Oglethorpe reported on his 
first visit. And they soon became a central element in Oglethorpe's plans for defending 
the expanding colony.
In the early spring of 1736 a detail of thirty Highlanders and forty Yamacraws 
built Ft. St. Andrews on Cumberland Island, ten of the Scots remaining as the fort's 
garrison. Highlanders also garrisoned Ft. St. George on the St. John’s River and Amelia 
Fort on Amelia Island, and the Darien militia under John Mohr Mackintosh built and 
garrisoned a fort at Darien. Highlanders also served Oglethorpe well as a display of
50
Georgia's military might and preparedness; they were conspicuously arrayed during a 
1736 meeting between Oglethorpe and Florida's governor Don Manuel de Montiano. 
Oglethorpe was so pleased with the Scots' initial execution of duty that he asked the 
Trustees to authorize the settlement of more of the hardy "mountaineers."
In addition, the new Georgians immediately set to cultivating the land around 
their town and enjoyed a surplus corn crop the following autumn. Just as in Scotland, 
however, the base of their economy came to be cattle and timber. Martyn, the Trustees' 
secretary, wrote that "they raised, at first, a considerable Quantity of Com. They feed . . . 
great numbers of cattle, and have many good sawyers, who make an advantageous trade 
of lumber." Oglethorpe also remarked on the Highlanders' productivity, calling them 
"most industrious" compared to the largely English population of Savannah, which was 
"most idle."35
The Scots made an odd, yet colorful, addition to the American frontier. Most 
spoke only their native Gaelic, isolating them as a group from other Georgians and 
causing Oglethorpe to discover that he must deal with them through their own leader, 
John Mohr Mackintosh. They dressed in the traditional Highland plaid, twelve or 
fourteen feet of colorful wool worn skirted and belted at the waist, the remainder either 
draped over the shoulders in cold weather, pinned at the shoulder, or tucked into the belt 
for freedom of movement. The plaid, or brechcan, was one of the earliest common 
garments worn in the Highlands. The pattern and colors of the plaid were not, it seems, 
associated with clans or families but were determined by a combination of personal 
preference, locally available dyestuffs, and the discretion of the weaver. As one early
35 Martyn, “An Impartial Enquiry into the State and Utility of the Province of Georgia,” 
CGHS /; “Letters from General Oglethorpe,” CGHS 3 pt. 2.
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eighteenth-century observer wrote: "Every isle differs from each other in their fancy of 
making plads, as to the stripes in breadth and colours. This humour is as different 
through the mainland of the Highlands, in so far that they who have seen those places are 
able, at the first view of a man's plad, to guess the place of his residence."36 Women 
commonly wore the earasiad, a white plaid with small stripes of black, blue, and red that 
reached from neck to heels.
The Highlanders also brought with them a rich culture of songs, stories, and 
Gaelic practices and beliefs that helped to further unify them and set them apart from 
their distant English neighbors. The Highlands had a long tradition of both written and 
oral folksong, in which all social strata shared, linking the top and bottom of society
• • • ”37together in a common culture of values and social attitudes. Gaels were an extremely 
poetic people; their oral culture reflected the prevailing attitudes of the time and were 
often inspired by Gaeldom-wide events. The most popular songs of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries were of a lyrical nature and often panegyric, passionate, tender, and 
personal in tone containing vivid imagery. Storytelling was central to the Highland 
culture. Parochial village stories and humor, often recited during the communal 
entertainment known as the ceilidh, were common and probably served to galvanize 
village communities and anchor their identities. Many of these stories were rooted deep 
in the traditions of Gaelic Ireland and Scotland and were composed by professional bards 
retained by chiefs to celebrate and glorify the chiefs achievements. This solicitation of 
loyalty further solidified clan organization and coherence.
36 Alexander MacDonald, Story and Song from Loch Ness-side, (Inverness, 1914), 43.
37 Derick S. Thomson, ed., The Companion to Gaelic Scotland, (Oxford, 1983), 80.
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The Trustees no doubt recognized the solidarity and separateness of the 
Highlanders. The fact that they equipped the new colonists with traditional weapons and 
clothing demonstrated their desire for the Highlanders to maintain their distinct culture, 
particularly their fighting prowess. Oglethorpe, who certainly understood the value of 
unity and coherence in a frontier fighting force, would come to describe whites, Indians, 
and Highlanders as distinct categories of individuals.
The Highlanders were vulnerable to attack while they fashioned a defensible town 
out of the wilderness. To protect them, Oglethorpe sent a detachment of McPherson's 
Southern Rangers, who would also be responsible for keeping open the path between 
Savannah and Darien. It was now that the Highlanders experienced their first contact 
with some of the Indians with whom they were to be closely involved — probably moreso 
than any whites -- over the next decade. Tomochichi, the Yamacraw chief, on his own 
initiative sent a group of his warriors to defend and otherwise assist their new neighbors. 
The Yamacraws apparently got on quite well with the Highlanders; they hunted for the
^  o
Scots and helped to familiarize them with the surrounding country. These Yamacraws 
were likely members of the two volunteer companies that Tomochichi had sent to 
Oglethorpe and had previously been attached to McPherson's rangers as "pathfinders," in 
addition to serving as scouts patrolling the Altamaha crossings.
The Highlanders would see a good deal of these Indians, whom Oglethorpe 
described as a "manly, well-shaped race." The initial friendliness between the two 
peoples should not have come as a surprise. As the Scots undoubtedly soon discovered, 
they had much in common with their new neighbors. They both valued hospitality to 
strangers, as Johnson and Boswell had discovered of the Highlanders and as Oglethorpe
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observed of the Indians. He noted that they "are a generous, good-natured people; very 
humane to strangers; patient of want and pain; slow to anger, and not easily provoked, 
but, when they are thoroughly incensed, they are implacable."39 Many Englishmen 
observed the same slow but violent temper in Highlanders.
The Highland clan system was not dissimilar to the Indians' tribal divisions and 
they both revered warrior prowess, courage, and honor, celebrating war through song, 
dance, and the recitation of past deeds. The war dance, which Oglethorpe witnessed 
during one of his visits to the Creek towns, incorporated this celebration. Warriors, 
decorated with skins, feathers, and paint, danced in a circle around tribesmen who sang 
and kept rhythm on their drums. At certain times, an individual warrior would command 
the others' attention as he sang of his own accomplishments in battle.40 Indians and 
Europeans alike regarded Creeks as first-class warriors. They enjoyed the "leisure to 
engage in war, a very serious game that they played with religious fervor."41 War was so 
central an element of Creek social and religious culture that warriors often enjoyed an 
elevated position in tribal society; the most highly revered became the wealthiest in 
society and were granted the use of several lodges.42
Creeks, like Highlanders, had a highly developed sense of honor and of right and 
wrong. Oglethorpe claimed that they "abhorfred] adultery," theft was unknown among 
them, and murder was considered the most heinous of crimes. But being a passionately
38 Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia, 55.
39 “Oglethorpe’s Account of Carolina and Georgia,” in Thaddeus M. Harris, ed., 
Biographical Memoirs o f General Oglethorpe, (Boston, 1841), 319.
40 Francis Moore, “A Voyage to Georgia Begun in the Year 1735,” CGHS I, 127.
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vengeful people, the Creeks did "not esteem the killing of an enemy, or one that has 
injured them, murder." This type of revenge fit the Creek definition of honor and duty.43
Both peoples also participated in similar types of local economy, combining 
subsistence agriculture with the hunting of wild game. Most eighteenth-century 
Europeans, accustomed to seeking a profit, could not understand this subsistence 
existence and lack of “industry” common among Indians. Similar to the commonly held 
English opinion of Highlanders, European colonists often remarked on the laziness and 
poverty of the Indians they encountered.44
Before long, a group of curious Creek warriors visited the Darien settlement and 
according to Oglethorpe, the two peoples "agree[d] very well" with one another.45 
William Mackintosh, son of John Mohr, even remarked that "the Indians were greatly 
attached to the Highlanders, not only as their being soldiers of their beloved man, General 
Oglethorpe, but because of their wild manners, of their manly sports, of their eastern 
costume, so much resembling their own."46 This "eastern costume" may have been a 
reference to the mantles worn by many of the Creek men, which Oglethorpe compared to 
the togas of ancient Romans. The growing respect between them even resulted in Scots
A n
and Creeks competing in a version of Highland games.
The newcomers likely did not realize that Indians rarely, if ever, engaged in 
athletic contests that held no ritual significance. Sports were often connected to healing, 
climate, hunting, battle, fertility, or to determine the superiority of one god over another.
43 Oglethorpe letter, 9 June 1733, in Harris, ed., Biographical Memoirs o f General 
Oglethorpe, 359.
44 John Pitts Corry, Indian Affairs in Georgia, 1732-1756, (Philadelphia, 1936), 35.
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As Joseph Oxendine, a renowned expert on Indian sport, states: "the outcome [of various 
contests] was assumed to be influenced by a power beyond the control of the
• • 40participants." Who knows the outcomes of these contests between Scots and Creeks? If 
the Highlanders were victorious, perhaps they earned the respect, admiration, and 
religious subordination of the Creeks, which might partly explain the good relations 
between the peoples. Or perhaps the Creeks were frequent winners, convincing them that 
their opponents were not a threat but potentially worthy allies in the fight against Creek 
enemies.
The Highlanders' new Creek friends also informed them of the danger and 
vulnerability of their situation. The Creeks' descriptions of the Spaniards and their Indian 
allies at St. Augustine and of the numerous French settlements and fortifications, as well 
as growing French influence among the Upper Creeks, revealed to the newcomers their 
precarious position. They found themselves in the middle of an intensifying international 
struggle for supremacy in North America. Oglethorpe was in the process of establishing 
his main garrison force at Frederica on nearby St. Simon's Island, but the fort built there 
would not be sufficiently occupied for two years. Until then, the closest source of 
European aid and support lay with the various ranger companies scattered about the 
region.
The Highlanders soon discovered that, in times of peace as well as war, their new 
Indian friends were their most immediate companions and allies. The two peoples would 
find themselves living, working, and fighting side-by-side. Even before the Darien
48 In 1636 the Jesuit missionary Jean de Brebeuf noted that among the Hurons games of 
lacrosse, in which all young men had a duty to participate, were often played in order to 
prevent terrible misfortune. Joseph Oxendine, American Indian Sports Heritage, 
(Champaign, Illinois, 1988), 6-7.
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settlers arrived Scotsmen and Indians interacted on several occasions. McPherson, who 
himself had contact with Indians much of his life as a Carolina militiaman and ranger, 
employed Yamacraw warriors as pathfinders for his Southern Rangers, who adopted 
much of the Indians' style of dress and operation. These rangers and Indians worked 
together in scouting a location for Ft. Argyle in 1733, and the Yamacraw volunteer 
companies, under a warrior named Skee, frequently visited the fort for rest, food, liquor, 
trade, and entertainment.49 Patrick Mackay learned a great deal about Creek culture 
during his controversial 1734 expedition to the Upper Creek towns. This party also likely 
included a number of Yamacraw warriors serving as hunters, guides, and scouts.
After the Darien settlers' arrival, Highlanders and Indians were involved in 
activities other than athletic contests. In 1739 Oglethorpe led an expedition to some of 
the Lower Creek towns in an attempt to secure their allegiance or neutrality in the 
inevitable conflict with the Spanish. Just as he had done during the previous year's 
summit with Florida’s governor Montiano, Oglethorpe brought with him several Scots, 
mostly gentlemen, including Lt. George Dunbar, Adjutant Hugh Mackay, Jr., and Aneas 
Mackintosh. This group soon rendezvoused with Lt. John Cuthbert, his six rangers 
(probably all Scots), and a group of Indian hunters and guides. At Coweta and Kashita, 
the party engaged in talks and occasionally joined their Indian hosts in ceremonial 
dances.50 Despite the fact that Oglethorpe included in his party some of the Highlanders 
with whom the Creeks agreed so well, the Indians refused to promise the general the 
large numbers of warriors he hoped for. The most he received was assurance of the 
Creeks' neutrality in any colonial conflict.
49 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 17.
50 Ibid., 86-87.
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IV
The long-anticipated showdown with Spain began in October 1739, just days after 
Oglethorpe returned from the Lower Creek towns. Many on both sides had expected war 
to break out earlier. Tensions had reached the boiling point in 1737 when the Spaniards 
demanded that the British remove their military complex — the Darien settlement, Ft. 
Frederica, and the several other forts dotting the islands south and east of Darien -- from 
Florida's doorstep. The Spanish king had ordered the governor of Cuba to prepare an 
invasion force to completely destroy Georgia. This force of over one thousand men was 
on the verge of sailing in early 1738 when the king sent an order canceling the plan; 
negotiations between the two nations had produced a promise to settle the boundary 
dispute. This promise was never peacefully fulfilled.
Although Britain's settlement in Georgia had pushed Spain to the brink of war, it 
was the British Parliament that made the formal declaration of war. The spark was 
provided by an incident involving an English smuggler, Robert Jenkins. The Spanish 
captured Jenkins and to punish him cut off his ear, which he preserved and presented to 
an outraged Parliament that immediately declared war. The conflict, dubbed the War of 
Jenkin's Ear, was a prelude to the War of Austrian Succession and was fought almost 
entirely on the Georgia frontier.51 Oglethorpe had, of course, been preparing for this 
moment for several years. In addition to erecting the forts guarding the Georgia coast 
and Inland Passage, the energetic general had returned to England in 1737 at the height of 
tensions, where he recruited a regular army regiment — the 42nd Regiment of Foot — for 
service in Georgia. He hoped the 42nd would provide a disciplined core for Georgia's 
provincial army, which consisted mostly of Highlanders and Indians not known for
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conventional European discipline or methods of fighting. Oglethorpe stationed 
companies of the 42nd at Ft. St. Andrews, Delegal's Ft., and at Frederica on St. Simon's 
Island, placing one company under the command of the trusted Highland gentleman 
Hugh Mackay, Sr. Unhappy with being transferred from their comfortable garrison post 
on Gibraltar to the dangerous American frontier, a large number of the soldiers at 
Frederica mutinied in the fall of 1738. Oglethorpe and his officers, protected by loyal 
Highlanders with drawn broadswords, bravely stood down the mutineers and preserved 
the coherence of Georgia's defense force.52
The Darien Highlanders, too, were prepared for war with their hostile southern 
neighbors. Forty more settlers — nearly all male servants of the Trustees -- had arrived 
from Scotland in November 1737 aboard the Two Brothers. On the same ship the 
Trustees sent 300 yards of tartan for shortcoats and hose, 1,200 yards of tartan for plaids, 
12 spinning wheels, and 300 pairs of shoes. Recognizing that war with the Spanish was a 
real possibility, they also sen t" 100 muskets and bayonets, 200 Indian arms . . . musket 
bullets . . . Indian gun bullets . . .  lead, one pair of bullet moulds of 9 holes each for the 
musket bore, and two iron ladles." The men and equipment were much needed. As 
early as April 1737 Darien militiamen had exchanged musketfire with a Spanish raiding 
party on Amelia Island and outside of Darien.54
When war was formally declared, Highlanders — true to their warlike nature — 
rushed to join two exclusively Scottish units authorized by Oglethorpe. The first was the 
29-man Troop of Highland Rangers, commanded by Hugh Mackay, Jr., who also held a
51 Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia, 75.
52 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 83.
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59
commission as adjutant of the 42nd. These Scottish horsemen were outfitted with 
broadswords, dirks, pistols, and sawed-off muskets. Initially they wore plaids and 
bonnets, but within six months had been issued shirts, breeches, shoes, stockings, hats, 
and blankets. The second and larger unit was the Highland Independent Company of 
Foot. It took John Mohr Mackintosh only five hours to recruit this infantry unit from the 
men of Darien and although he was authorized to recruit 115 men, he exhausted the 
potential pool of recruits at seventy. They, too, dressed in plaids, and carried muskets, 
broadswords, and dirks.55 These Highlanders would serve as the backbone of the colony's 
forces in the coming war. Serving alongside English and Indian comrades, they were 
involved from beginning to end and played pivotal roles during both major campaigns.
Oglethorpe often combined Indian and Highland warriors for duties that required 
a mobile force capable of quick and ferocious attacks. The Highlanders' reputation for 
reckless but viciously effective charges and their ability to move quickly in small groups 
over rough terrain suited them for the job. The natives' tactics and style of fighting, as 
Oglethorpe had learned, bore many similarities to those of their Gaelic allies, and their 
knowledge of the local terrain and geography made them invaluable members of scouting 
and raiding parties. Not surprisingly, Indian warriors, like Highlanders, had little regard 
for formal British military discipline. British authorities had difficulty predicting and 
controlling their "wild" Indian allies, who had such a high regard for fighting that 
"sensing war in the air, [they] began committing outrages" against the Spanish as early as 
173 8.56 During the war Oglethorpe expressed his displeasure at the Indian custom of
54 Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia, 69.
55 Ivers., British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 100-01.
56 Corry, Indian Affairs in Georgia, 119.
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torturing prisoners and on one occasion even ransomed captive Spaniards with some of 
Georgia's precious horses.
As Patrick Mackay learned during his 1734 expedition, Creek warriors and their 
Yamacraw cousins were typical of local Indians in operating most effectively in small, 
independent raiding parties. One of Oglethorpe's lieutenants noted that "Indians were 
useful for fighting against the Spanish Indians and for ravaging Spanish farms, but they 
were of no use in besieging a town as regular troops, and would storm a breach only 
when the way was led by the English."58 Indians often attempted surprise night attacks on 
enemy camps by sneaking up, some of the attackers firing muskets and rushing in with 
hatchets, while others hold their fire until they are among the enemy. Similar to the 
Highland charge, this method of attacking maximized the attackers' advantage and the 
victims' terror; at times Indian attackers became so enraged that they were in danger of 
killing before identifying their victims.59 The British soon discovered that, like 
Highlanders, Indians were most effective when commanded by one of their own. For 
much of the 1740 campaign against St. Augustine, the half-Indian Thomas Jones 
commanded a sizable Indian contingent.
The Highlanders in Oglethorpe's army saw action early. In fact, the first two 
casualties of the war were Highlanders, indentured servants ambushed and beheaded by 
Spanish-allied Yamasees as they gathered wood for the garrison at Amelia Fort. The first 
British offensive move was a December 1739 raiding party of 200 men, consisting of 
Highland and other rangers, regulars, militia, and Indians. (Oglethorpe did not receive 
the 2,000 Indian warriors he had requested. He had a tendency, even when dealing with
57 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 148.
58 Corry, Indian Affairs in Georgia, 126.
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fellow Englishmen, to request much more than was reasonable with the expectation of 
getting what he truly needed. In the end about 200 Indians, mostly Cherokees and 
Uchees, with a few Lower Creeks, Yamacraws, and Chickasaws fought for the British in 
the first campaign of the war.) This party did little damage, but succeeded in scouting the 
territory north of St. Augustine.
Oglethorpe's first major offensive took place the next month and was aimed at 
capturing Ft. Pupo on the west bank of the St. John's River eighteen miles west of St. 
Augustine, which controlled a communication route between the town and the Spanish 
stronghold of Apalachee. The attack force of 180 included the Troop of Highland 
Rangers, Indians, and a detachment of the 42nd, which manned four small cannon. In an 
effective use of manpower, Oglethorpe sent the fast-moving Highlanders and Indians 
ahead to scout the way. Once across the river they engaged Ft. Pupo's defenders in a 
brisk skirmish that lasted the entire afternoon, while the redcoats erected a battery in the 
woods near the fort. The skirmishers did their job well; the Spanish were unaware of the 
cannon until the crews began to send solid shot smashing into the fort's walls. The 
defenders surrendered after only two volleys from the British guns and Oglethorpe left a 
detachment of Highlanders to garrison what was now Georgia's southernmost outpost.
The Highlanders and their Indian comrades had proven their worth and their ability to 
work together effectively.
Oglethorpe realized that the time for attacking St. Augustine and its protective 
Castillo de San Marcos was upon him. The town's defenses were weak, its inhabitants 
terrified, he had the support of the Royal Navy, 200 Indian allies, and South Carolina, 
and King George II had ordered him to capture the Spanish town. He made his
59 Moore, “A Voyage to Georgia,” CGHS I, 126.
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preparations quickly; the small fleet of British warships would have to leave for more 
sheltered waters before the June hurricane season. After capturing Ft. Diego — twenty 
miles north of St. Augustine — without a fight, Oglethorpe and nearly 1,000 regulars, 
Georgians, South Carolinians, Highlanders, and Indians made their way overland south 
toward St. Augustine, confident of victory. It was to be a combined land-sea operation 
with the British forces attacking from both the north and east. During the march, as 
before, Oglethorpe used Highlanders and Indians as scouts and raiders. Indian raiding 
parties succeeded in driving Spanish plantation owners into St. Augustine and in cutting 
off communication and supply routes.
The unexpected presence of six Cuban half-galleys in St. Augustine's harbor 
disrupted the British plan and caused Oglethorpe to make a revision that likely cost the 
British the battle. In order to prevent the Spaniards from foraging north of town, 
Oglethorpe drew together a "flying party" whose mission it was to patrol the area north of 
town around Ft. Mosa, staying mobile and never spending more than one night in any 
particular location. This party consisted of Oglethorpe's lightest-equipped, most mobile, 
and most trusted troops: rangers, Highlanders, and Indians, with a core of disciplined 
redcoats.
The "flying party" never got off the ground. Hugh Mackay, Jr., the senior officer 
in effective command, and Colonel John Palmer, a South Carolina militia volunteer, 
constantly argued over the proper disposition of the mixed party. As a result, the elite 
force did not carry out their duties to their full potential. They never left Ft. Mosa and 
soon settled into a routine. After less than a week at their post, Spanish troops and 
Yamasee Indians launched a successful dawn surprise attack on the demoralized and
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unorganized British party. During the swift and confusing battle, the bulk of the 
Highlanders attempted to defend the fort's gate, successfully repulsing two Spanish 
charges. William Stephens reported of this valiant stand that the Highlanders "made such 
havoc with their broadswords, as the Spanish cannot easily forget."60 The Spanish 
onslaught proved too much, however. The Highlanders had left their bayonets and 
targets behind to lighten their load and as their numbers dwindled the broadswordsmen 
became vulnerable to the well-disciplined Spaniards' bayonet charges.
In the end sixty-three of the 137-man British force lay dead and twenty were 
taken captive, including John Mohr Mackintosh. The Highland units had suffered as 
heavily as any other, losing two-thirds of the Independent Company and nearly one-half 
of the rangers. Survivors of the disaster found their way back to the army's main body. 
The defeat at Ft. Mosa cost Oglethorpe dearly and, unable to maintain his early 
advantage, he withdrew the army three weeks later. Had Oglethorpe been clearer as to 
who was in official command of the "flying party," Mackay or Palmer, things might have 
been different. The constant bickering between the two — and the Highlander's 
stubbornness — had allowed the party to become lazy and ineffective. Remaining 
immobile in one place for several days without an effective and inspirational leader, the 
Highlanders and Indians were not used to the greatest advantage.
After the unsuccessful invasion of Florida, Georgia's surviving Highland soldiers, 
defeated and bloodied but still dangerous, were scattered among the various frontier forts 
in an effort to regroup and prepare for the inevitable Spanish counterattack. Still held in 
high regard by Oglethorpe, the Scots resumed their familiar duties as scouts, raiders, and 
messengers. The Troop of Highland Rangers, under Hugh Mackay, Jr., was divided
60 Harris, ed., Biographical Memoirs o f General Oglethorpe, 236.
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between Ft. St. Andrews and Darien. The Highland Independent Company of Foot had 
lost its commander and only numbered sixteen men by May 1741, having been decimated 
by disease and the Spanish at Ft. Mosa. Later that year the addition of fifteen new 
recruits from Scotland bolstered the company's ranks, once again making it a valuable 
and effective force.
The opportunity for the British to avenge their 1740 defeat came two years later 
with the expected Spanish invasion of Georgia. In the young colony's most desperate 
hour, General Oglethorpe would prove to be an inspirational field commander and would 
turn to his trusted Highland men and their Indian allies to turn back the Spanish tide.
The 1,950 Spanish invaders — regulars, dragoons, artillerymen, provincials, 
militiamen, and Yamasees — had one objective: to utterly destroy Georgia and leave it a 
barren wasteland. The Spaniards drove for the very heart of the colony, running a weak 
British blockade and landing the invasion force on the southern tip of St. Simon's Island. 
They intended to destroy the main British garrison at Frederica before continuing north 
into South Carolina. As the Spaniards marched north toward Frederica, British 
inhabitants, including the Scots at Darien, were thrown into a panic and fled for the 
relative safety of Savannah and Ft. Argyle. Even Carolinians just north of the Savannah 
River sought shelter from what was shaping up to be the realization of one of their worst 
nightmares. Oglethorpe quickly gathered his forces at Frederica. The Highland company 
and rangers were called from the mainland to join several Creeks, Chickasaws, and 
Yamacraws, as well as the 42nd regiment. In all, Oglethorpe could muster only five 
hundred men, very little artillery, and no men-of-war to face the invading army.
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On 7 July 1742 a Spanish reconnaissance force came to within 1.5 miles of
Frederica before it was discovered by a small ranger patrol which, after briefly
skirmishing with the enemy, retreated to Frederica to inform Oglethorpe. The general
sprang into action, ordering the Highland company, rangers, and a group of Indians to
follow him and engage the approaching enemy in the woods, before they reached open
ground where they could form ranks and overwhelm the British with numbers. The
Highlanders and Indians responded brilliantly. Screaming their various war cries, the
fastest afoot of the defenders charged headlong into the leading elements of the Spanish
/ 1
column in "what could only be termed a full Highland charge." Crashing into the weary 
Spaniards with broadswords, dirks, and war-clubs, the defenders-tumed-attackers broke 
the column’s advance. The main body, terrified by the ferocity of the un-European-like 
attack, turned and fled into the woods. Thirty-six Spaniards lay dead or wounded, while 
a single Highlander perished from heat exhaustion.
Eager to press his advantage, Oglethorpe organized the Highlanders, Indians, and 
reinforcements from the 42nd in preparation for a Spanish counterattack and then turned 
back to Frederica to hasten the arrival of more troops. It was all over before he reached 
his destination. Having regrouped, the Spanish continued their advance, but were 
stopped by withering musket fire from the Highlanders, Indians, and English hidden 
behind hastily-built breastworks in the woods. The Spaniards' return volleys panicked 
three platoons of the 42nd, which fled the scene. The remaining platoon of redcoats 
joined its comrades in forcing the Spanish to retreat, causing Oglethorpe to remark, "We
61 Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia, 90.
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have some Satisfaction for the Blood at Moosa. The white people[,] Indians, and the 
Highlanders all had their share in the Slaughter."62
The latter two groups had again proven that their similar styles of fighting -- 
quick, mobile, and ferocious — lent well to cooperative action. Together the Gaels and 
Indians had nearly single-handedly repulsed an overwhelmingly superior force of 
Spaniards, which, unchecked, might have destroyed Georgia and South Carolina, 
changing the course of American history.
The Battle of Bloody Marsh, as this skirmish came to be called, was the last major 
action of the War of Jenkin's Ear. The Spanish threat subsided and only a few small- 
scale British raids took place in the following few years. The first bloody chapter of 
Georgia's history was coming to a close, and with it, the Highlanders' role as guardians of 
the southern border. In September 1744 a royal warrant placed Georgia's provincial 
troops — including 115 Highlanders — in the king's pay, retroactive to September 1743. 
The Highland Rangers remained a separate unit and were divided between Ft. St.
Andrews and Darien. John Mohr Mackintosh returned from captivity in Spain to resume 
command of the Highland Independent Company, which received as reinforcements from 
England thirty mutineers of the regular Royal Highland Regiment of Foot in 1743.
Despite these newcomers the company was still only at half-strength (52 privates) in 
1746 and found itself used for patrol duty but no offensive operations.
Oglethorpe himself returned to England after the failed Spanish invasion of 
Georgia, where he remained for the rest of his life. He gradually lessened his
62 Ibid., 91.
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connections to Georgia and eventually resigned from the Trustees before the colony 
reverted to the crown in 1750. Ironically, the general who had led Jacobites in battle — 
and had even worn the Highland plaid — commanded a brigade of British troops charged 
with capturing Prince Charles Stuart during the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion. He suspiciously 
allowed the Bonnie Prince to escape, however, which effectively ended his military 
career.
Although King George's War (the culmination of the War of Jenkin's Ear) did not 
officially end until 1748, Georgia's 400 provincials were disbanded in 1747. Until then, 
soldiering had been the single largest occupation in the colony, and these men's return to 
full-time civilian life placed a strain on the already depressed Georgia economy. Many 
of the fortified settlements south of the Savannah were abandoned; only Savannah, 
Augusta, and Darien survived.
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CONCLUSION
Did the town of Darien meet the Trustees' goal of a settlement of yeomen farmers 
with a hoe in one hand and a musket in the other? Certainly the Darien Scots proved 
their worth as warriors and successfully defended their new home, but what was the 
effect of the frequent fighting on the settlement itself? How was the town able to 
survive?
The first group of Scots settlers in 1736 succeeded in producing a substantial crop 
of com in their first year. In fact, observers of the new settlement often remarked on the 
prosperity and progress of the Scots. The Earl of Egmont wrote that they were 
"extraordinary industrious" and another observer, in a letter to the Trustees, commented 
how the Scots were "very forward in their settlement at Darien.”1 Due to the 
inadequacies of the soil near Darien, however, the Highlanders soon had to turn to 
Savannah for assistance in feeding themselves. From that point on, cattle and timber 
became the main industries of the region; throughout the Trustees' rule the large number 
of soldiers in the region provided a healthy market for beef and lumber.
The almost immediate demand for soldiers — even before fighting broke out — 
placed a severe drain on the manpower of Darien, making it difficult to maintain either 
family farms or the industries of the region. By 1737, the need for men to build forts and 
to serve on militia patrols prompted Oglethorpe to send for the second group of
1 Robert MacPherson, ed. The Journal o f the Earl o f Egmont: Abstracts o f the Trustees ’ 
Proceedings for Establishing the Colony o f Georgia, 1732-1738, (Athens, 1962), 217; 
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Highlander recruits who arrived aboard the Two Brothers in November. The drain on 
Darien's inhabitants also prompted Benjamin Martyn to write that the need for defense 
"drew the People off from their Labor in the Sowing Season . . . and they were obliged to 
make Preparations for their Defense."2 The Earl of Egmont predicted that the "pressures 
of continual preparedness combined with limited provisions could cause a civil revolt 
among the settlers."3 On two occasions this prediction nearly came true when the Darien 
Highlanders threatened to leave Georgia for South Carolina.
The first of these near desertions came in 1738. The freeholders of Darien raised 
several complaints to Oglethorpe in the summer of that year: growing debts for supplies, 
hardships brought on by the system of land tenure, lack of credit, and the brutal and 
arbitrary rule of Mackintosh and Mackay, who were probably competing for control of 
the settlement. They demanded a public store be established in Darien. Oglethorpe, 
instead of lose his valuable Highlanders to Carolina, consented to their demands. The 
Trustees blamed not the Darien Highlanders for the discontent in the colony, but a group 
of disgruntled English and Lowland Scots in Savannah, known as the "Malcontents," who 
filed a petition with the Trustees demanding changes in land tenure and the allowance of 
slave labor in the colony. Oglethorpe, knowing these demands were completely counter 
to the ideal of the Trustees, used the Highlanders’ position to his advantage. In exchange 
for loans, an extension of credit, and a public store, Oglethorpe convinced the Darien 
men to sign their own counterpetition in opposition to slavery. They did and disaster was 
averted.
2 Martyn, “An Account Showing the Progress of the Colony of Georgia,” CGHS 3, 207.
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70
Trouble surfaced again the next year. Darien inhabitants charged Mohr 
Mackintosh with mismanagement of the Trust store and with hoarding the best provisions 
for himself while distributing bad com and rotten cheese to the settlers.4 They again 
planned to move as a group to Carolina, but the declaration of war interrupted their plans 
and they threw themselves into the work of defending their new home.
The Highlanders had obviously not left the hardship of life in Scotland to be 
exploited in America and took necessary steps to provide for their own welfare. It is 
interesting that in one moment they were willing to abandon Georgia and in the next they 
were flocking to defend her; in one moment they were complaining about the rule of 
Mackintosh and Mackay and in the next were following them loyally into battle. These 
actions are a testimony to the traditions of Highlanders. They were fiercely independent 
and concerned for their well being, while at the same time deeply loyal to their leaders 
and comrades. Oglethorpe had recmited the right group of individuals.
With the coming of war and the Battle of Ft. Mosa, the Darien settlement suffered 
its hardest days. In fact, it nearly died completely. Most of the men of the town had 
joined the two Highland units, and the majority of them were killed or captured at Ft. 
Mosa, leaving Darien full of widows and orphans with no one to work the land, cattle, or 
sawmills. The defeat at Ft. Mosa was blamed for "putting an end to the settlement of 
Darien; for there are now in that place not one quarter of the number who settled there at 
first, and that is made up mostly of women and children."5 By October 1740 the 
casualties at Ft. Mosa and the defection to Carolina of several families left only fifty-
4 Ibid., 74.
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three of approximately 250 settlers. Assistance was on its way from the Trustees, 
however, who once again looked to the Scottish Highlands for more recruits to revive 
Darien and to replenish the ranks of the decimated Highland units.
Forty-three new recruits aboard the Loyal Judith arrived in Georgia in September 
1741. Many of these new immigrants were Mackays, but much like the group that 
arrived in 1737, they represented several different clans. The provisions supplied by the 
Trustees tell much about their expectations for the continuing survival of Darien and 
Georgia. Unlike the first group of Highlanders in 1736, these Scots received an 
abundance of tools suited for farming and the timber industry.6 The Trustees reaffirmed 
their commitment to establishing a secure colony of farmers, as difficult as that had 
proven to be to accomplish. Furthermore, the Trustees altered the system of land tenure 
from tail male to tail general, allowing women to inherent. The Highlanders had proven 
themselves so valuable that the Trustees adapted their plans to the settlers' wishes.
The experience of the Highlander community of Darien proves the conflicting 
nature of the Trustees' goals for these earliest Georgians. With defense as top priority it 
was quite difficult for the men and women of Darien to successfully establish themselves 
as yeomen farmers. Although the men of Darien served the British Empire successfully 
by helping preserve the young colony, the time they spent away from their homes was 
time in which the settlement suffered greatly. Only between periods of heightened 
military intensity and after the War of Jenkin's Ear were the hardy inhabitants of Darien 
able to establish themselves securely. The survival of Darien speaks not only to the 
resourcefulness and hardiness of its Scottish inhabitants, but also to the determination of
Period” in The Clamorous Malcontents: Criticisms and Defenses o f the Colony o f  
Georgia, 1741-1743. Edited by Trevor R. Reese, (Savannah, 1973), 104.
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the Trustees, their recognition of the value of having the Scots on the frontier, and their 
willingness to adapt their plans to the needs of those colonists.
After Georgia reverted to the crown and began to grow, Darien gradually lost its 
character as an isolated and self-contained community of Gaelic-speaking Scots. Slavery 
was introduced to Georgia in 1750 leading to the development of huge rice plantations 
along the coast. Many of the Darien Scots who had opposed slavery in 1739 became the 
largest land- and slaveowners in the colony. And when the American Revolution broke 
out in 1775 the majority of Scots and Scottish-Americans in the region chose to rebel 
against the government for which they had fought so well three decades before. Those 
who remained loyal to the crown had their lands confiscated by the victorious United 
States government.
II
The town of Darien exists to this day; some two hundred of its 1,788 inhabitants 
claim direct descent from the original colonists and still celebrate their Highland
n
heritage. Their forebears certainly deserve to be celebrated. Not only did they possess 
the courage and loyalty to one another to leave their homeland and settle in an untamed, 
hostile, and unfamiliar environment, but they proved that they were the hardy, warlike, 
and resourceful people that James Oglethorpe and the Georgia Trustees thought they 
were. Recruited for a specific purpose, they met Oglethorpe's and the Trustees' 
expectations by remaining an isolated and culturally distinct group that proved its warlike 
reputation was well deserved. And despite periods of discontent and protest that
6 Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia, 84-85.
7 Ibid., 99.
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threatened the survival of Darien and of Georgia, the Darien Highlanders proved 
invaluable to the establishment of the colony.
It may be impossible to know the impressions the American frontier environment 
had on these Highlanders since most did not speak English and were almost certainly 
illiterate. Frequent contact with Indians and the nearly constant state of alarm surely 
altered the Scots' long-held traditions in a way that added to the culture of these new 
Americans. One can only wonder at the influence these two groups -  natives of worlds 
an ocean apart -  had on one another’s culture. A popular Scottish-American poem of the 
late eighteenth century, however, provides a glimpse at the Scots’ perspective:
We’ve become Indians surely enough.
Skulking under trees, not one of us will be left alive,
• 8with wolves and beasts howling in every lair . . . .
The Scots, in turn, added something great to American tradition and history. Without 
their constant vigilance, resilience, and effectiveness in battle, the history of the 
American southeast might be quite different indeed.
8 Macrae, “Sleep Softly, My Darling Beloved,” in MacDonell, The Emigrant Experience, 
43.
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